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Social capital is believed to spur regional economic development. Since the ground-
breaking works of Putnam, scholars hypothesized that it determines how well institu-
tions function at the regional level and thus influences a region’s economic perfor-
mance. In Europe, a positive association between social capital and regional per-capita 
income levels could be established. However, is such a relation also found in a set of 
developing countries? This study investigates the relationship between social capital 
and subnational economic development in a sample of Sub-Saharan African countries. 
Using Afrobarometer data on trust, it estimates the relationship by Ordinary Least 
Squares (OLS) and Instrument Variables (IV). The OLS results suggest that trust is not 
significantly related to regional economic development in Sub-Saharan Africa. Exploit-
ing regional differences in ethnolinguistic diversity and distances to slave demand cen-
ters, the study tries to isolate a potential effect of social capital via IV estimation. Alt-
hough the results seem to corroborate the OLS findings, caveats remain since distances 
to slave ports were unrelated and deep cleavages of ethnic diversity only weakly related 
to trust. (JEL: R11, O11, O55, Z13) 
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The ten poorest countries in the world are all found in Africa1. In Sub-Saharan Africa the average 
GDP per capita converted by purchasing power parity (PPP) amounts to Int$ 3,926 only. About 40% of 
the population there still live from less than $1.90 a day (all according to World Bank, 2019). Why is 
poverty in Africa still so pervasive? When analyzing the determinants of economic growth, literature 
has for a long time focused on natural capital (Malthus, 1798), physical capital (Solow, 1957) or human 
capital (Lucas, 1988). More recently, scholars have investigated other factors. Acemoğlu, Johnson, and 
Robinson (2002) emphasize the role of institutions and assert that their growth-inhibiting character in 
Africa dates to the European colonization. Nunn (2008) showed how the slave trade negatively influ-
enced long-term development and in a follow-up study (Nunn & Wantchekon, 2011) discussed how the 
slave trade engendered a culture of mistrust. This thesis aims to investigate whether (as Nunn suspects) 
this lack of social capital can be directly attributed to Africa’s low development level. 
The relationship is analyzed at the regional level in Sub-Saharan Africa. The sample comprises 30 
countries and 335 regions. The main social capital proxy used in this thesis is generalized trust, data on 
which is available in the Afrobarometer and the World Value Surveys (WVS). Regional income data 
stems from the UNDP, which provides estimates of subnational Gross National Income (GNI) of all 
countries in the world. As most data on social capital stems from the fifth wave of the Afrobarometer 
conducted between 2011 and 2013, the regional GNI in 2013 is used as a proxy for economic develop-
ment. Analyzing the relationship between social capital and income raises two major concerns. First, 
omitted variables can potentially determine both current levels of social capital and development sim-
ultaneously and second, reverse causality is possible. The relationship between social capital and current 
development might work in both ways, that is social capital is relevant in explaining present income 
levels but is simultaneously influenced by that very same factor (Algan & Cahuc, 2014). To address 
these identification issues a two-pronged approach shall be followed. On the one hand, the relationship 
between trust and income is estimated at the regional level so that fixed effects can be included which 
pick up country-wide time-invariant characteristics. To avoid that the results are driven by some unob-
served factor at the regional level, a whole host of control variables that account for general geographic 
conditions, climatic factors, natural resources, regional education levels, and urbanization are included. 
On the other hand, instrument variables shall rule our reverse causality. The two instruments conceived 
in this thesis both use historic events to measure the exogenous variations in social capital. The first 
utilizes the haphazard colonial border demarcation which led to ethnic homelands being severed and 
ethnic groups being lumped together randomly making African countries and regions the most ethnically 
diverse in the world. Gershman and Rivera (2018) measure this diversity using various fractionalization 
and polarization indices which take varying inter-group differences into account by examining how 
 




close the languages spoken by different ethnic groups are. Following Desmet, Ortuño-Ortín, and Weber 
(2009), it is believed that ethnic heterogeneity indices which measure deep ethno-linguistic cleavages 
have a substantial negative effect on generalized trust without impairing economic development directly. 
The second instrument follows Nunn (2008) and Nunn and Wantchekon (2011) and uses the slave trade 
as exogenous source of variation in social capital. As in Nunn (2008), the distance of each region’s 
capital to its nearest slave demand center in the Transatlantic, Red Sea, Indian Ocean and Trans-Saharan 
slave trade is computed. It is believed that regions closer to these demand centers were more strongly 
affected by the slave trade and are hence particularly low trusting until today.  
To my knowledge, this thesis is the first attempt to examine the relationship between social capital 
and economic development at the regional level in Sub-Saharan Africa. Moreover, neither ethnic diver-
sity nor distance to slave ports were used before to instrument generalized trust. However, one must 
conclude that both instruments exhibit salient shortcomings in that they are only weakly related to gen-
eralized trust. The indices of ethnic diversity are moreover correlated with some of the covariates in 
particular with education. Therefore, all results are likely to be biased and must be interpreted with much 
caution. Both OLS and IV estimations fail to establish a significant relation between generalized trust 
and regional economic performance. This result is substantiated in various robustness checks. Using 
other trust dimensions, viz. trust in relatives, neighbors, and other people you know, an alternative proxy 
of regional development (night-time luminosity), a high-trust dummy or group membership as alterna-
tive measures of social capital fail to establish a significant relationship between social capital and re-
gional economic development. Therefore, bearing in mind the caveat that the estimates are likely to be 
biased, social capital seems not to be a significant determinant of regional income in Sub-Saharan Af-
rica. 
The remainder of this thesis is outlined as follows: Section 2 presents the concept of social capital, 
how it can be measured, and its relation to economic development by reviewing notable contributions 
to the literature. Section 3 describes the data and delivers descriptive statistics to the social capital and 
development proxies as well as to the control variables. Section 4 delineates the estimation strategy and 
explains the rationale behind both instruments. Section 5 present the results of the OLS and IV estima-
tions. Section 6 carries out the mentioned robustness checks. Section 7 concludes. 
 
2. Literature Review 
2.1. Definition of social capital 
The concept of social capital was first described by the sociologist Bourdieu (1985). For him social 
capital is a resource that stems from group membership as well as social networks and is based on mutual 
recognition. It can be utilized by single actors to improve their position in the pursuit of their goals, as 
social capital can multiply the effect of other forms of capital (Bourdieu distinguishes between eco-
nomic, cultural and social capital). Thus, members from groups that share the same characteristics and 
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only differ with respect to the social capital they have created, can wind up in very different positions 
in society (Siisiäinen, 2000). Coleman’s (1990) notion of social capital is similar as he defines social 
capital by its function. The term comprises social structures of whatever form which all have in common 
that they facilitate certain actions of individuals within that network. Coleman (1988), for example, 
shows how social capital within families can bolster the children’s acquisition of human capital. In doing 
so, social capital can take different forms: Parents helping their children study or parents being merely 
physically close to their children. Just like Bourdieu, Coleman emphasizes the benefits of social capital 
that accrue to a single actor.  
However, as the concept of social capital entered economics, it became a trait of societies itself 
whose benefits are enjoyed by all its members. Putnam (1993a) refers to social capital as moral obliga-
tions and norms, social values (especially trust) and social networks which lie at the bottom of a region’s 
economic success and political integration. Thus, Putnam made it possible to compare the stock of social 
capital across regions, nations, and countries. For example, Putnam claims that southern Italy is less 
prosperous than the north because of a lack of social capital which impairs the efficient functioning of 
regional institutions. Fukuyama’s (1995) argument is similar in that he shares Putnam’s view that social 
capital influences economic performance. However, he proposes a different mechanism and speaks of 
trust rather than social capital. For Fukuyama trust is the social creed that individuals must subordinate 
their self-interests to those of a larger group. If trust is present in a society, individuals can establish 
large privately owned corporations which then propel economic development (Gray, 1997).  
However, treating social capital as a collective resource in one instant and as an individual asset in 
another, can be problematic. Portes (2000) points out how ambiguities about the term itself arise. Sce-
narios become possible in which individual social capital undermines collective social capital – a lobby 
group, for example, that circumvents a new legislation thanks to the “right connections” but thus harms 
social cohesion. Moreover, Portes criticizes the circular reasoning inherent in collective social capital. 
On the one hand, social capital promotes the well-functioning of democracies, and, on the other hand, it 
is engendered by the very same outcomes. Guiso’s, Sapienza’s, and Zingale’s (2011) critique points in 
a similar direction. Social capital can be perceived as something inherently positive (as Putnam does) or 
as something ambiguous and sometimes negative (as Bourdieu does). Fukuyama (2001) addresses this 
critique and tries to harmonize the concepts of individual and collective social capital. His definition 
restricts social capital to informal norms that facilitate cooperation across individuals thus delineating it 
from trust, networks, civil societies, and other by-products. These norms can create both positive and 
negative externalities. Puritans’ conviction to treat everyone morally – be it a family member or a 
stranger – is a positive, the Ku Klux Klan’s hatred towards outsiders a negative externality. In the former 
case, social capital can straddle groups and whole societies, while in the latter case, cooperative norms 
do not spread to other groups and might even be confined to subgroups of the larger community. The 
sum of social groups connected through norms of cooperation and their positive and negative external-
ities determine the stock of social capital within a society which can designate its economic and political 
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success. Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (2011) introduce the concept of civic capital to clarify the equiv-
ocal meaning of social capital. Their definition resembles that of Fukuyama in that civic capital encom-
passes all “those persistent and shared beliefs and values that help a group overcome the free rider prob-
lem in the pursuit of socially valuable activities”. Like Fukuyama’s later definition social (or civic) 
capital is about norms, values, and beliefs and not about networks and relationships per se. However, 
unlike Fukuyama’s conception of social capital, this definition has a clearly positive connotation. Civic 
capital only includes beliefs and values that help groups to pursue socially valuable activities and thus 
excludes the deviant norms of the Ku Klux Klan. 
 
2.2. Models of cultural transmission 
In a critique to Fukuyama (1995), Solow (1995) notes that the concept of social capital does not 
just lack a lucid definition but also classic characteristics of other forms of capital, viz. investment and 
depreciation processes which alter its stock. Additionally, social capital must be somehow measurable. 
Scholars have responded to that critique by conceiving models of how social capital and other cultural 
traits in general come about. A first notable attempt is that of Bisin and Verdier (2001) who designed a 
model of intergenerational cultural transmission in which parents carve their children’s preferences by 
evaluating rationally - that is based on their own set of values - what cultural traits to pass on. The 
equilibrium of this model is both backward- and forward-looking. It is backward-looking because par-
ents assess which cultural traits to pass on according to their own set of values while it is forward-
looking because parents take the future of their children’s ever-changing social environment into ac-
count. Thus, cultural characteristics like the norms and values incorporated in the concept of social 
capital tend to abate only slowly. However, as Tabellini (2008) notes, the forward-looking component 
also creates a “strategic complementarity” between values and behavior, that is they reinforce them-
selves. In his extensions of the model, if values of generalized morality which accentuates “good” be-
havior towards everyone abound (in contrast to limited morality in which these values only apply to a 
person’s close friends and family), then cooperation across individuals spreads which then again helps 
the propagation of generalized morality itself. Well-functioning inclusive institutions underpin cooper-
ation and can hence procreate good values, whereas the lack of those promotes bad values and behaviors 
like cheating on others. Thus, a society can wind up in two distinct equilibria: One of limited morality 
and low cooperation and one of generalized morality and widespread cooperation.  
Tabellini’s model illustrates how values are transmitted over time. However, social capital encom-
passes both values and beliefs. Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (2008) devised an overlapping generation 
model that outlines the transmission of beliefs – in particular trust in the stock market. Children’s beliefs 
are first molded by their parent’s beliefs and then updated by their own real-world experiences. If parents 
transmit a deep general trust towards other individuals to their offspring and this belief is reciprocated, 
then these children can make a large profit from trade. However, if not, they incur heavy losses. To 
protect their children, parents tend to be too careful when passing on their beliefs and underestimate the 
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value of own experiences. As in Tabellini’s model, two final equilibria are possible: If benefits from 
trading are sufficiently high and the probability of being cheated on consequently below a certain thresh-
old, then a high-trust equilibrium can be sustained. However, if not, individuals withdraw completely 
from the market and forfeit the opportunity to update their beliefs so that an equilibrium of mistrust 
evolves. All these models tend to suggest that social capital unlike physical capital increases with use 
because of the complementarity of values, beliefs, and behavior. Parents invest in social capital by trans-
mitting their values and beliefs to their children and by rebuking deviant behavior. So does the education 
system and inclusive institutions that corroborate cooperation and thus benign values and beliefs (Guiso 
et al., 2011). But social capital can also depreciate through changes in the economic and social environ-
ment or through historic events or episodes (Guiso et al., 2011). The financial, debt and refugee crises 
of the European Union, for instance, is believed to have caused a trust crisis and the rise of populism in 
Europe (Algan et al., 2017). The slave trade – even though abolished over a hundred years ago – gener-
ated an even more salient culture of mistrust in Africa (Nunn & Wantchekon, 2009). 
 
2.3. Measurement of social capital 
As Solow (1995) notes, if social capital is indeed capital, then it must be somehow measurable. 
However, social capital is an ambivalent and multidimensional phenomenon, making it hard to quantify. 
In an attempt to categorize social capital, Kaasa and Parts (2008) differentiate between structural and 
cognitive social capital where the former comprises civic participation, formal networks (voluntary or-
ganizations), and informal networks (friend and family circles), while the latter encompasses general 
and institutional trust, and norms like trustworthiness. Grootaert et al. (2004) divide social capital into 
six dimensions: “groups and networks” and “trust and solidarity” correspond to structural and cognitive 
social capital respectively, “collective action and cooperation” as well as “information and communica-
tion” are ways in which social capital operates, whereas “social cohesion and inclusion” as well as “em-
powerment and political action” are outcomes of social capital. Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2011) 
only distinguish between indirect and direct measures of social capita. The former tries to discern values 
and beliefs, that is the foundation of social capital, whereas the latter tries to capture its outcomes, which 
are defined more broadly than in Grootaert et al. (2004) including all structural components of social 
capital and thus also group membership, networks, and collective action.  
The first to face the problem of measurement was Putnam (1993, 1995) who referred to voter turn-
out in referenda, newspaper readership, and membership in voluntary associations (like soccer clubs or 
literacy circles) to show how social capital is scarce in South Italy and how it is in the retreat in the 
United States. However, as voluntary organizations and other groups vary substantially in size, political 
clout, internal cohesion, and the externalities they bring about, merely counting their number can be 
misleading (Fukuyama, 2001; Engbers et al., 2017). Therefore, scholars (Knack, 2003; Beugelsdijk & 
van Schaik, 2005; Rodríguez-Pose & von Berlepsch, 2013) have tried to distinguish between groups 
that cause positive and negative external effects: “Putnam groups” are those envisaged of the said 
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scholar and embrace civic organization that pursue a common good thus promoting social capital and 
growth. “Olson groups”, instead, are rent-seeking associations (e.g., lobbying groups) operating for their 
own benefit and thus potentially growth harming (Olson, 1982). Nevertheless, subsuming groups into 
broad categories is subjective itself and hence might aggravate the problem more than attenuating it. 
Therefore, scholars have retreated to other outcome-based social capital variables like parking violations 
by UN diplomats in New York City (Fisman & Miguel, 2006), organ (Guiso et al., 2016) and blood 
donations (Guiso et al., 2004; Buonanno et al., 2009; Crescenzi, et al., 2013).  
On the other hand, researchers have tried to create direct measures of social capital which capture 
values and norms. In essence, there are two ways to measure these: Surveys and experiments. The former 
has the advantage of being readily available for various countries (e.g., the World Value Survey, Euro-
pean Social Survey, General Social Survey, Euro-, Afro- Latinobarometer) but exhibits the caveat that 
they might fail to capture true values and beliefs since participants could be hesitant to reveal those. 
Experimental measures, instead, can be easier to interpret and can be made incentive-compatible by 
using real money but on the flipside, they are expensive, and the samples are often small and non-
representative leading to issues of external validity (Guiso et al., 2011; Alesina & Giuliano, 2015). The 
most popular direct measure of social capital is generalized trust which captures how much an individual 
generally trusts his or her compatriots (in contrast to personalized trust which examines trust towards a 
well-defined individual, e.g., a family member or a superior). Trust itself is sometimes considered a 
separate component of social capital (e.g., as a dimension in Kaasa & Parts, 2008; Grootaert et al., 2004), 
as a belief itself (e.g., Guiso et al., 2011), or as a direct consequence of social capital (e.g., Woolcock, 
2001; Putnam, 2001).  
Altogether, most scholars agree that trust can be deemed a good proxy for social capital. Usually 
generalized trust is measured via the question “Generally speaking, would you say that most people can 
be trusted or that you need to be very careful in dealing with people?” with “Most people can be trusted” 
and “Need to be very careful” as answer options. Whether this question aptly captures trust levels of a 
society has been subject of debates among scholars. Fukuyama (2001) criticizes that one cannot deduce 
how much and who exactly respondents trust and how likely they are to cooperate. Glaeser et al. (2000) 
find that the question rather captures trustworthiness than trust as only the former is correlated with the 
results of their experiment. However, Fehr et al. (2003) find the exact opposite result using the same 
experimental setting but a larger and more heterogenous sample2. Sapienza, Toldra, and Zingales (2007) 
refine the experiment3 and resolve the contradicting results by separating between a belief-based and a 
preference-based component of trust. They discover that trusting behavior in the experiment is 
 
2  Both Glaeser et al. (2000) and Fehr et al. (2003) have conducted a survey about generalized trust and trustworthiness and a trust game 
devised by Berg, Dickhaut, & McCabe (1995). In this experiment a first mover is endowed with a specific amount of money and gets to 
decide how much money to send to a second mover. The amount sent is then doubled and the second mover can in turn decide how much 
to return. The amount sent by the first mover indicates his/her level of trust, while the amount returned by the second mover indicates 
his/her level of trustworthiness.  
3  In their refined version of the experiment all subjects got to play both sides of the game. All subjects first had to indicate how much to 
send, then how much they expect to receive, and then how much they will return themselves. To motivate subjects to answer accurately, 
they were rewarded for correct expectations.   
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influenced by both4, but answers to generalized trust questions are only correlated with the belief-based 
component. To measure the preference-component, the authors suggest questions on past trusting be-
havior. Naef and Shupp (2009) corroborate these findings by discovering that trusting behavior in the 
experiment is most strongly correlated with survey-based trust measures when individuals are asked 
how much they trust strangers. Therefore, trust can be considered an apt measure of social capital also 
because it is positively correlated with a whole host of institutional development measures. Moreover, 
there is no stigma attached to either answer opportunity of the generalized trust question, so that one can 
expect people to answer truthfully. This is not necessarily true for other survey questions about beliefs 
and values like peoples’ opinion whether or not disobeying the law or cheating on taxes is justifiable 
(Guiso et al., 2011).  
 
2.4. Social capital and institutions 
Social capital is believed to influence economic development by determining how well nation-wide 
institutions function at the regional level. The idea of institutions that subvert social cohesion goes back 
to Alexis de Tocqueville (1840, p. 93) who noted that  
“Despotism (...) sees in the separation among men the guarantee of its continuance, 
and it usually makes every effort to keep them separate. (...) A despot easily forgives his 
subjects for not loving him, provided they do not love one another.”  
 
The French philosopher and political scientist maintained that by creating mistrust among the people, 
despots can rule over them more easily. Therefore, Tocqueville can be seen as an early scholar of a 
literature which claims that institutions and social capital are mutually reinforcing. Putnam (1993) con-
tends that social capital influences the way in which institutions operate. Regional institutions in north-
ern Italy function better than their southern counterparts because social capital is stronger in the North. 
Helliwell and Putnam (1995) present first empirical evidence for this hypothesis. They use a government 
reform of 1977 which granted more power to regional governments as a natural experiment and observe 
that interregional income convergence processes reversed, indicating that institutions in regions with 
low social capital function less well. Putnam (1993), furthermore, believes that institutions in turn favor 
the creation of social capital. He attributes the abundance of social capital in northern Italy to its inclu-
sive institutions in the Middle Ages. Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (2016) substantiate this hypothesis 
empirically by exploiting regional variations within the North. They show that cities which did not ex-
perience a period of self-governance exhibit significantly lower levels of social capital today. Moreover, 
they show that social capital levels rise with the persistence of beneficial institutions. Tabellini (2008) 
 
4  Expectations about the trustworthiness of others (how much receivers would return) are highly correlated both with how much they trust 
others and their own trustworthiness (as receivers). In homogenous populations players’ expectations are molded by their own behavior, 
that is they trust others if they are trustworthy themselves. This explains why Glaeser et al. whose sample is very homogenous consisting 
of Harvard undergraduate students only, find a high correlation between the generalized trust question and trustworthiness but not between 
the survey question and senders’ behavior. In very heterogenous population, on the other hand, players’ expectations do not hinge upon 
their own preferences regarding trustworthiness but only on their beliefs. Thus, Fehr et al. who use random German households find that 
survey questions are correlated with senders’ behavior but not with trustworthiness.  
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finds similar evidence. Investigating second generation US citizens, he finds that individuals whose 
parents are from a country which was a century ago ruled democratically, are more likely to value trust 
and respect for others. European regions with more inclusive institutions exhibit higher levels of gener-
alized morality. Moreover, he discovers that regions which highly value trust and respect tend to perform 
better regarding governance indicators and are generally more developed.  
Nannicini, Stella, Tabellini, and Troiano (2013) create a model of political agency to describe how 
social capital determines the functioning of institutions. Individuals (civic voters) who share cultural 
traits of solidarity and cooperation hold politicians accountable to higher standards, penalizing them if 
they fail to comply with these standards. They will do so even if they are the beneficiaries of clandestine 
policies because their utility depends on the aggregate welfare level. However, their model includes a 
second, uncivic type of voters which is only concerned with individual or group-specific welfare. This 
second group allows incumbent politicians to pursue a “divide and rule” strategy (just like the despot in 
Tocqueville’s quote). The uncivic voters tolerate the politician’s lapses as long as he enriches them. The 
rents a politician can extract decreases with the share of civic voters. Thus, social capital constrains the 
power of politicians and the well-functioning of institutions. The authors find empirical evidence for 
their model, in that politicians from Italian regions with low levels of social capital are more likely to 
be absent in parliament and to be prosecuted. Moreover, regions with high social capital tend to penalize 
misbehaving politicians more.  
 
2.5. Empirical studies on social capital and economic development 
Scholars have tried to discern the effect of social capital on economic development also empirically. 
The first econometric investigation was that of Knack and Keefer (1997). Using the World Value Sur-
vey’s data on how much people generally trust their compatriots as well as how much they object asocial 
behavior, they find a positive relationship between social capital and economic growth in a cross-section 
of 29 countries. Zak and Knack (2001) second these results extending the sample to 41 economies. 
Moreover, they empirically test the propositions of their model that trust is lower if institutions are weak, 
society is heterogenous, and the economy is unfair. They find that higher trust levels are indeed corre-
lated with better institutions and lower inequality regarding income or land. However, ethnic fraction-
alization – the proxy of a society’s homogeneity – is only significantly related to trust in a quadratic 
function indicating that Horowitz (1985) was right in that inter-group differences are maximized when 
there is a limited number of relatively large groups which pose a serious threat to dominate all others. 
Temple and Johnson (1998) confirm the positive correlation between social capital and economic 
growth by proxying the former via indices of social development constructed in the 1960s. Temple 
(1998) furthermore finds that this positive association is also present in Africa. La Porta, Lopez-de-
Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1997) find evidence for the hypothesis that social capital (or trust) boosts 
economic growth by facilitating cooperation and thus enhancing the performance of large organizations 
(e.g., Putnam, Fukuyama, Nannicini et al., Tabellini, etc.) by discovering that trust is correlated with 
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government effectiveness, participation in civic organizations, and the relative size of firms. Whitely 
(2000) even ascertains that social capital’s impact on economic growth is at least as strong as that of 
human capital. However, all these cross-country comparisons exhibit shortcomings viz. coefficient in-
stability due to multicollinearity, omitted variable bias, and limited degrees of freedom (Michalopoulos 
& Papaioannou, 2017). Thus, these results only represent mere correlations and not causal effects. In an 
attempt to tackle some of these issues, scholars of social capital moved to cross-regional studies which 
account for nation-wide factors like institutions. Building upon Putnam’s hypothesis that social capital 
determines how well institutions perform at the regional level, Beugelsdijk and van Schaik (2005) ana-
lyze its association with regional economic growth in European regions and find a positive correlation 
between growth and both generalized trust and associational activity. Tabellini (2010) refines the former 
scholars’ investigation tackling its endogeneity problem by instrumenting culture through historical po-
litical institutions and education levels. He ascertains a positive and significant effect of the social capital 
measures on subnational development levels. Neira, Vázquez, and Portela (2009) verify the positive 
relation between social capital and economic growth in Europe using a panel data model rather than a 
regional approach. In contrast, Gennaioli, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2013) investigating 
a whole host of different determinants of regional development find that their culture measures – trust 
and ethnic heterogeneity – exhibit no significant relationship to GDP/capita.  
This thesis builds on this literature by investigating the relationship between social capital and re-
gional economic development in Sub-Saharan Africa. Unlike the works of Beugelsdijk and van Schaik, 
Tabellini, and Neira et al., it focuses on developing countries. The only study which has included a wide 
array of developing countries is Gennaioli et al. (2013). Although it covers most countries in the world, 
Africa is somewhat underrepresented. This problem is particularly striking when the authors include 
their trust variable. The World Values Surveys (wave 1 to 5) polled people in 69 countries, only ten of 
which were Sub-Saharan African. This thesis uses data from the Afrobarometer and the World Value 
Survey and covers 30 Sub-Saharan African economies. Most researchers believe that the poor growth 
performance of developing countries can be associated with a lack of social capital. Francois and 
Zabojnik (2004) propose that low levels of trust and trustworthiness can trap developing countries in 
poverty even if new technologies and techniques become available. Zak and Knack (2001) state that 
trust is low if institutions are weak, societies heterogenous, and economies unfair – all of which is true 
in most African economies – and that this dearth of social capital prevents people from saving thus 
hindering economic growth. As less developed countries are often simultaneously fraught with low lev-
els of trust and poor institutions, many scholars adopt a pessimistic view regarding potential develop-
ment leaps. Nannicini, Stella, Tabellini, and Troiano (2013) allege that a low level of social capital can 
incentivize politicians to follow a divide and rule approach in which they underpin their power by en-
riching their supporters. Thus, political leaders can establish authoritarian rule upheld through cronyism 
and nepotism and preclude economic development. Africa – the ethnically most fractionalized continent 
– seems to be particularly prone to this pernicious relationship between crony capitalism and despotism. 
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Burgess et al. (2015), for example, convincingly show how in Kenya ethnic favoritism sprawls under 
autocratic regimes whereas it was constrained during democratic periods. On the other hand, some schol-
ars believe that social capital can overcome weak institutions. Ahlerup, Olson, and Yanagizawa (2007) 
suggest that abundant social capital supersedes feeble legislation and ineffective law enforcement by 
creating a set of informal rules. Thus, countries can develop even without strong institutions. Bisin and 
Verdier (2017) likewise show how a favorable set of cultural norms can not only assert itself against 
other traits inimical to economic growth but also spur the development of benevolent institutions.      
 
3. Data 
The sample consists of 30 Sub-Saharan African countries and 335 regions. Wherever possible, the 
highest administrative division was used which corresponds to regions or provinces. As the administra-
tive units of the Afrobarometer and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) did not al-
ways correspond, some subregions had to be merged into larger aggregates5.  
Using Guiso’s, Sapienza’s, and Zingales’ (2011) definition of “civic capital”, this thesis follows 
their recommendation to measure it via the generalized trust question, that is “Generally speaking, would 
you say that most people can be trusted or that you need to be very careful in dealing with people?” The 
proportion of people in a given subnational administrative unit answering “Most people can be trusted” 
serves as the main proxy of social capital of that region. Additionally, other trust dimensions shall be 
considered (following Nunn & Wantchekon, 2011): How much people trust their relatives, neighbors, 
and other people they know. Unlike the generalized trust question, these latter questions allow inter-
viewees to choose from four different options when asked how much they trust the respective group or 
institution: i) “not at all”, ii) “just a little”, iii) “somewhat”, and iv) “a lot”. For the sake of comparability, 
responses i) and ii) as well as iii) and iv) are lumped together. The generalized trust question does not 
correlate much with responses from other trust questions6. Membership in religious communities or 
voluntary groups is moreover used as alternative proxy of social capital. The most recent data can be 
found in the 2011/13 wave of the Afrobarometer. The survey covers 34 African countries and indicates 
the region each interviewee is from. As this thesis concentrates on Sub-Sahara Africa only and the pro-
posed instruments are not applicable for Northern African and the African island countries7, they must 
be excluded reducing the sample to 28 nations8. Data on two further states9 could be gleaned from the 
 
5  The countries in which lower subdivisions had to be merged into larger ones are Uganda, Sierra Leone, and Malawi. Subdivisions of the 
Afrobarometer had to be merged in Botswana, Côte d’Ivoire, Benin, Burundi, and Zanzibar in Tanzania. Sometimes cities had to be 
merged with their surrounding area. This was the case for Lomé and the surrounding Maritime region in Togo, Ouagadougou and the 
Centre region in Burkina Faso, and Niamey and Tillabéri in Niger.   
6  A table summarizing all correlation can be found in the appendix (table 8.1). 
7  Neither does Gershman’s and Rivera’s data set cover these nations nor is it sensible to compute the distance to the location of slave de-
mand as these countries were rather destinations for slaves. The Northern African countries excluded are Algeria, Egypt, Morocco, and 
Tunisia. The island countries excluded are Cape Verde and Mauritius. Following Nunn and Wantchekon (2011) Madagascar is included.  
8  These countries are Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Côte d’Ivoire, Cameroon, Eswatini, Ghana, Guinea, Kenya, Lesotho, Li-
beria, Mali, Madagascar, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Sudan, Togo, Tanzania, Uganda, 
Zambia, and Zimbabwe. 
9  Ethiopia and Rwanda. 
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World Value Survey extending the total sample to the 30 countries of table 3.1 and their respective 337 
subdivisions.  
 
Table 3.1: Composition of the sample by country. 
 












Country Region Type Obs. 
Benin Departments 12 
Botswana Districts 9 
Burkina Faso Regions 13 
Burundi Provinces aggregated to statistical regions 5 
Côte d’Ivoire Regions (pre-2011) 19 
Cameroon Regions 10 
Eswatini Regions 4 
Ethiopia Regional states and chartered cities 11 
Ghana Regions (pre-2018) 10 
Guinea Regions 8 
Kenya Provinces (pre-2010) 8 
Lesotho Districts 10 
Liberia Counties 15 
Madagascar Regions (post-2009) 22 
Malawi Regions 3 
Mali Regions (pre-2012) 9 
Mozambique Provinces  11 
Namibia Regions (pre-2014) 13 
Niger Regions  8 
Nigeria States 37 
Rwanda Provinces (pre-2006) 12 
Senegal Regions (pre-2008) 11 
Sierra Leone Provinces (pre-2017) 4 
South Africa Provinces 9 
Sudan States/Wilayat (pre-2012) 15 
Tanzania Regions (pre-2012) 21 
Togo Regions 5 
Uganda Regions 4 
Zambia  Provinces (pre-2011) 9 
Zimbabwe Provinces 10 
Total  337 
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Figure 3.1: Regional distribution of generalized trust in Sub-Saharan Africa.  
 
The figure depicts the regional distribution of the generalized trust question conducted by the Afrobarometer. Red colors correspond to relatively 
low levels of trust, blue colors to higher levels of trust. Source: Own creation.  
 
The sample covers most of West, East, and South Africa. Unfortunately, Central Africa was neither 
surveyed by the Afrobarometer nor the World Value Survey. The highest trusting region is Northern 
State in Sudan where 93% indicated that they generally trust people, the least trusting regions are Gam-
bela and Harari Peoples’ region in Ethiopia, Rivercess county in Liberia, and the Amoron’i Mania region 
of Madagascar where no interviewee responded to generally trusts people. The summary statistics of all 
trust questions can be found in table 3.2. Figure 3.1 displays the regional distribution of generalized trust 
in the sample. In comparison, the highest trusting countries in Europe according to the WVS are 
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Denmark, Norway, and Finland where around 70% of the people indicate that they generally trust most 
people. Germany, Spain and the United Kingdom exhibit mediocre values of around 40%, while most 
Eastern European and Balkan countries are low trusting with values of 10% to 25%. The lowest trusting 
European country is Albania where only 2.8% of the people believe that they can trust most people10. 
 
Table 3.2: Summary Statistics of the social capital proxies. 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Generalized Trust 335 .196 .155 0 .933 
Trust in Relatives 323 .813 .184 .153 1 
Trust in Neighbors 335 .618 .23 .025 1 
Trust in other people you know 335 .422 .209 0 1 
      
Religion Member 335 .422 .214 0 1 
Religion Active Member 335 .32 .216 0 .9 
Voluntary Member 311 2.184 .57 .19 3.29 
Voluntary Active Member 311 .244 .151 0 .7 
The table presents descriptive statistics of the social capital proxies used in this study.  
 
Regional income data is gleaned from the subnational Human Development Index (HDI) dataset 
of the UNDP, which uses the Gross National Income (GNI) at purchasing power parity (PPP) to compute 
the income subindex of the HDI. As most data on social capital stems from the fifth wave of the Afroba-
rometer conducted between 2011 and 2013, the regional GNI in 2013 is used as a proxy for economic 
development. Since nighttime luminosity is becoming increasingly popular as subnational development 
proxy (e.g., Henderson et al., 2012; Michalopoulous & Papaioannou, 2017), its relationship with social 
capital shall be additionally examined. Light intensity data is available for 25 countries of those included 
in the Afrobarometer 2011/13, whereas the GNI data covers all 30 countries of the sample. Descriptive 
statistics can be found in table 3.3. Figure 3.2 illustrates the pattern of GNI/capita in the sample. The 
poorest region in terms of GNI per capita is Bulawayo in Zimbabwe followed by Northern Burundi11 
both of which exhibit a per-capita income of under 700 US-$ (at PPP). Thus, both regions belong to the 
poorest in the world undercutting the Democratic Republic of the Congo – the poorest country of the 
world in 201312. The richest region in the sample is South-East Botswana where people earn on average 
25,920 US-$ a year. In 2013, this corresponded to per-capita income levels of Greece (25,940 US-$) 
and as of 2019 to those of Chile (25,190 US-$) or Turkey (26,860 US-$). 
 
Table 3.3: Summary Statistics of regional development proxies. 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
 GNI/capita (in thousand US-$) 337 3.398 3.688 .64 25.92 
 ln Light Intensity 273 -1.249 1.906 -4.605 3.97 
This table summarizes descriptive statistics on regional development proxies. For presentation purposes, logs were not yet applied to GNI/capita.  
 
10  All data on generalized trust in Europe was taken from the seventh wave of the World Value Survey. 
11  Northern Burundi comprises the provinces Kayanza, Kirundo, Muyinga, and Ngozi. 
12  The Democratic Republic of the Congo had a GNI/capita of 690 $ (at PPP) (World Bank Open Data). As of 2019, Burundi is the only 
country exhibiting a nation-wide GNI/capita of below 1000 $ (at PPP) (790 $).  
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Figure 3.1: Regional distribution of GNI/capita in Sub-Saharan Africa.  
 
The figure illustrates the distribution of gross national per-capita income in Sub-Saharan Africa. Red colors correspond to relatively poor regions in 
terms of GNI/capita, blue colors to comparatively rich regions. Source: Own creation.  
 
In order to avoid omitted variable bias, various control measures are included. Regional education 
data is provided by the UNDP. To construct the subnational HDI, they use expected and mean years of 
schooling. Moreover, the literacy rate is considered which is provided by the Robert Strauss Center for 
International Security and Law who compiled a dataset of various regional education measures mostly 
based on data from the Demographic and Health Surveys program (DHS) and the UNICEF Multiple 
Indicator Cluster Surveys (MICS). For Sudan and Botswana, literacy data stems from the national cen-
tral statistics bureaus. Descriptive statistics are provided in table 3.4. 
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Table 3.4: Summary statistics of education controls 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
 Expected schooling 337 9.934 2.479 2.35 14.9 
 Mean schooling 337 4.716 2.571 .3 12.1 
 Literacy rate 337 .587 .266 .095 .989 
The table shows descriptive statistics on education variables. 
 
On average, students (of 2013) can expect to go nine years to school while the total population 
spent on average less than five years in school, thus only finishing primary education. In South-East 
Botswana people spent an average 12 years in school – the highest value in the sample, whereas in vast 
parts of Burkina Faso (with the Sahel region at the bottom of the list) people spent only a couple of 
months in school. In the sample, only a little more than half the people are literate. The lowest literacy 
rate is found in the Tillabéri region of Niger where only every tenth person can read. Unsurprisingly, in 
urban areas (Harare and Bulawayo in Zimbabwe, Nairobi in Kenya, Analamanga with the Malagasy 
capital Antananarivo) and in regions of South Africa and Namibia almost everybody can read.  
To account for the geographic characteristics of a region a whole range of different factors is in-
cluded. For expositional purposes they are divided into four groups, general geographic data, climate 
data, natural resource data, and human geography data (broadly following Mitton, 2016). General geo-
graphic variables comprise latitude, longitude, elevation, capital, land area, landlock, and terrain rug-
gedness. Latitude and longitude are measured in absolute values expressed in degrees and thus indicate 
the distance to the equator and the null meridian, respectively. The southern-most region (and thus also 
that furthest from the equator) is Western Cape in South Africa, while Dakar in Senegal is the region 
which lies the most western. Timbuktu in Mali is the northern-most region; Sava in Madagascar the one 
furthest in the East. Elevation measures the mean height of each region in meters. The lowest-lying 
region is Conakry in Guinea, which only encompasses the Guinean capital situated on the Kaloum Pen-
insula and the neighboring Tombo Island. The highest region in terms of average elevation is the Butha-
Buthe district in Lesotho which has an average elevation of almost 3,000 meters. To set this in context, 
Tyrol in Austria has an average elevation of mere 712 meters, Grisons in Switzerland of 1,292 meters. 
Six further Basotho regions lie on average above 2,000 meters making Lesotho the highest country of 
the sample. Land area is the surface in square kilometers. The capital regions of Conakry, Guinea and 
Niamey, Niger are the smallest regions in terms of land area, the desert regions of Agadez in Niger and 
Timbuktu in Mali are the largest regions. Agadez is over 600,000 km² and thus almost double the size 
of Germany (ca. 357,000 km²). Landlock and Capital are dummy variables. Landlock becomes one if a 
region has no access to the sea and zero otherwise, Capital becomes one if a country’s capital is within 
the respective region and zero elsewise. Data on terrain ruggedness at the subnational level is provided 
by Shaver, Carter, and Shawa (2016) who compute each region’s mean terrain ruggedness. As these 
authors sometimes use outdated boundaries or second-level administrative borders, the data had to be 
computed by hand for some regions. A rugged terrain is difficult to cultivate making agriculture difficult. 
Moreover, it is believed to offer hideouts for criminal gangs or rebels. The least rugged region is the 
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Centre Region of Burkina Faso, the Basotho regions are the most rugged ones (with Butha-Buthe district 
again topping the list).  
Climatic factors include the average yearly temperature and precipitation, the yearly temperature 
range and precipitation range, average yearly sunshine hours, humidity, rain days, and wind speed. The 
coldest regions in the sample are all found in Madagascar with Anosy being the coldest with an average 
temperature of 10.8°C which broadly corresponds to that of Frankfurt, Germany (10.6°C). The hottest 
region is Gao in Mali with an average temperature of 30,1°C. Littoral Region in Cameroon is the rainiest 
region of the sample both in terms of precipitation and in terms of annual rain days (Douala, the capital 
of Littoral Region has more than double as much rain days as the “Rain City” Seattle: 243 compared to 
119 rain days per year). The most humid region is the South-West region in Cameroon which is also the 
cloudiest region (in terms of average daily sunshine hours). The driest region in terms of precipitation 
is River Nile, in terms of rain days and average humidity Northern State, both in the Sudanese Sahara. 
Both are also the sunniest regions of the sample. Besides the Saharan region, regions which lie in the 
Namib and/or Kalahari Desert (e.g., Erongo, Hardap, and Karas all in Namibia) belong to the driest and 
sunniest ones in the sample. The windiest region is Sava at the northern cape of Madagascar (windier 
than “Windy City” Chicago where wind blows at an average 18.4 km/h compared to 24.2 km/h in 
Antsiranana – the capital of Sava), while Nimba County, Liberia is the calmest region.  
The natural resources considered are oil and gas, diamonds and other gemstones, precious metals, 
base metals, iron, and elements commonly used in alloys. Oil and gas is defined as the number of 
onshore oil and gas fields in each jurisdiction which is provided by the United States Geological Survey 
(USGS). Delta State in Nigeria has 110 and therefore the most oil or gas fields in the sample. Almost 
all fields are found in southern Nigeria (besides Delta State, Rivers and Bayelsa States have an abun-
dance oil or gas sites). Diamonds includes the number of sites at which diamonds or other gemstones 
are reported in the Mineral Resources Data System (MRDS) of the USGS. Most diamonds are found in 
Free State followed by Northern Cape in South Africa. The MRDS gathers reports describing metallic 
and nonmetallic resources throughout the world and indicates their exact location. Data on 1,752 mineral 
sites located within regions of the sample are identified and the different mineral resources categorized 
into base metals, precious metals, iron, and alloys. Base metals includes copper, lead, nickel, aluminum, 
cobalt, germanium, cadmium, magnesium, mercury, potassium, titanium, tin, uranium, zirconium, and 
lithium. Most base metals are found in Limpopo, South Africa. Almost all South African regions have 
notable deposits of base metals as well as the Copperbelt and Central region in Zambia and the Masho-
naland regions in Zimbabwe. Precious metals encompasses gold, silver, and the platinum group.13 The 
most are found in Gauteng, South Africa followed by the South African provinces Free State, Limpopo, 
North-West and Mpumalanga. Outside South Africa, Mashonaland West and Midlands in Zimbabwe, 
Oromia in Ethiopia, and Western Province in Sierra Leone have notable deposits of precious metals. 
 
13  The platinum group includes platinum, ruthenium, rhodium, palladium, osmium, and iridium.  
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Alloys comprises carbon, manganese, chromium, molybdenum, vanadium, boron, cerium, and other rare 
earth elements14, niobium, tungsten, tantalum, hafnium, and rhenium. Again, they are mostly found in 
South African provinces (Limpopo, North-West, Northern Cape) followed by provinces of Zimbabwe 
(Midlands, Mashonaland East). Base metals, iron, and alloys are all scaled by total land area of the 
region they are located in, whereas precious metals, diamonds, and Oil & Gas are not, following the 
assumption of Mitton (2016) that precious resources have a substantial effect on a region’s development 
level regardless of its land area. The last control included is the urbanization rate of each region. Data 
was gleaned from Gershman and Rivera (2018) as well as statistical reports of countries which were not 
covered in the mentioned study15. Unsurprisingly, the city regions exhibit the highest urbanization rate16. 
The most rural areas are Amoron’i Mania in Madagascar, the three provinces of Burundi as well as the 
states Ebonyi, Taraba, and Zamfara in Nigeria. Summary statistics of all geographic controls are pro-
vided in table 3.5. 
 
Table 3.5: Summary statistics of geographic controls. 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Basic geographic variables      
Latitude 337 12.171 7.415 0 33.228 
Longitude 337 20.402 14.395 .034 49.855 
Landlock 337 .682 .466 0 1 
Capital 337 .089 .285 0 1 
Land Area 337 46196.043 68560.121 76.482 621417 
Elevation 337 681.306 606.672 3 2849 
Terrain Ruggedness 336 63.012 75.311 3.608 455.693 
      
Climate variables      
Temperature 355 24.058 3.887 10.8 30.1 
Precipitation 355 1162.034 904.397 8.2 3758.6 
Temperature Range 337 6.204 3.36 .9 17.4 
Precipitation Range 337 219.875 199.141 2 3223 
Sunshine 337 8.378 1.734 4.483 10.908 
Humidity 337 .657 .688 .083 12.583 
Rain days 337 106.467 57.135 2.25 243 
Windspeed 337 12.155 6.534 3.563 117.48 
      
Natural resources variables      
Oil & Gas 337 1.122 8.781 0 110 
Diamonds 337 .098 .612 0 9 
Precious metals 337 4.389 30.863 0 425 
Base metals 337 .103 .386 0 4.362 
Iron 337 .022 .104 0 1.454 
Alloys  337 .043 .167 0 2.181 
      
Human geography variables      
Urbanization 337 .323 .248 0 1 
The table reports summary statistics for all geographic controls. For expositional purposes, variables were subsumed into four categories: Basic 
geographic variables, Climate variables, Natural resources variables, Human geography variables. 
 
14  The rare earth elements (REE) are not distinguished in the MRDS. They comprise all lanthanides as well as scandium and yttrium.  
15  Viz.: Benin, Burundi, Côte d‘Ivoire, Lesotho, Madagascar, Senegal, Tanzania, and Uganda. 
16  Bulawayo and Harare (Zimbabwe), Kigali (Rwanda), Niamey (Niger), Nairobi (Kenya), Bamako (Mali), Addis Ababa (Ethiopia), Cona-
kry (Guinea), Lagos (Nigeria), and the Littoral region in Benin which corresponds to Benin’s largest city Cotonou.   
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4. Estimation Strategy 
The baseline specification is a simple linear model of the following form: 
 
𝒚𝑐𝑖 =  𝛼 + 𝛽𝑺𝑪𝑐𝑖 + 𝛾𝑿′𝑐𝑖 + 𝜹𝑐 + 𝑖  (4.1) 
Where 𝒚𝑐𝑖 is one of the development outcomes in region 𝑖 in country 𝑐, 𝑺𝑪𝑐𝑖 is one of the social 
capital measures, 𝑿′𝑐𝑖 is a vector of control variables, 𝜹𝑐 is the full set of country fixed effects, and 𝑖 
the error term17. In the base regressions of section 5, generalized trust serves as the social capital proxy 
and the natural logarithm of GNI/capita as the dependent variable. When checking the robustness of the 
results in section 6, other social capital measures (trust in relatives/neighbors/other people you know, 
group membership, and high-trust dummies) are evaluated. Moreover, night-luminosity is used as alter-
native development indicator. Like GNI/capita, it is logarithmically transformed with the only difference 
that a small number is added beforehand. This procedure follows previous literature (Gershman & Ri-
vera, 2018; Hodler & Raschky, 2014; Michalopoulos & Papaioannou, 2014) and prevents observations 
from taking on the value of zero as well as alleviating the effect of outliers. Estimating the relationship 
between social capital and income raises two major concerns. On one side, omitted variables can poten-
tially determine both current levels of social capital and development and on the other side, reverse 
causality is possible. To tackle these problems a two-pronged approach will be used in which a large set 
of control variables shall obviate omitted variable bias and instrument variables shall guarantee the di-
rection of causality.  
 
4.1. Control Variables  
To ensure that the results are not driven by country-wide unobservable characteristics, this thesis 
analyzes the relationship between social capital and economic development at the regional level. Thus, 
a set of country fixed effects, 𝜹𝑐, can be included. However, this strategy cannot rule out the possi-
bility that social capital might not actually measure the effect trust has on income but rather pick up 
other regional characteristics (Algan & Cahuc, 2014). Such factor could comprise local or regional in-
stitutions as well as geographic factors. Gennaioli, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, & Shleifer (2013), for 
example, discover that education explains a substantial share of variations in regional development. 
Although geographic factors measured by temperature, distance to the sea, and natural resource endow-
ments are significant, their explanatory power falls behind that of education. Culture and institutions 
exhibit no significant relation to regional income levels. Mitton (2016) investigates the relationship be-
tween regional development and a whole host of different geographic and institutional variables. He 
finds that institutions have no significant influence on income at the regional level, but several geo-
graphic factors do (terrain ruggedness, tropical climate, ocean access, temperature range, storm risk, & 
natural resources). Moreover, he confirms the results of the latter study and finds a strongly significant 
 
17  Throughout the thesis, clustered standard errors were used. 
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association between regional education and income. Dell, Jones, and Olken (2009) examine the rela-
tionship between sub-national income and geography at the municipality level in the Americas and ob-
serve that temperature is negatively associated with income at the regional and local level. Michalopou-
los and Papaioannou (2014) study within-ethnicity differences in economic performance of ethnic 
groups whose homelands were severed by the colonial border demarcation. Thus, they control for geo-
graphic and cultural factors and isolate the effect of formal nation-wide institutions. However, national 
institutions were unrelated to within ethnicity differences in economic development.  
As this literature shows, in order to avoid omitted variable bias, it is essential to control for educa-
tion and geography. The according variables are described in section 3. Since institutions have never 
been found to influence regional development levels, they are not explicitly accounted for (Gennaioli et 
al., 2013; Michalopoulos & Papaioannou, 2014; Mitton, 2016). The vector 𝑿′𝑐𝑖 usually includes all 
control variables presented in the previous section to minimize potential omitted variable bias.  
 
4.2. Instrument Variable Approach  
The second prong of the identification strategy is the instrument variable approach. The relationship 
between social capital and current development might work in both ways, that is social capital is relevant 
in explaining present income levels but is simultaneously influenced by that very same factor (Algan & 
Cahuc, 2014). Numerous variables have been found to exhibit a significant relationship to growth, inter 
alia institutions (Hall & Jones, 1999; Acemoğlu, Johnson, & Robinson, 2002) geography (Sachs, 2003), 
historical events (Nunn, 2009), immigration (Tabellini, 2019; Sequeira, Nunn, & Qian, 2020), and biol-
ogy via the genetic transmission of characteristics (Ashraf & Galor, 2013) or through psychological 
backlashes (Haushofer & Fehr, 2014). All these determinants of development, however, can potentially 
affect trust as well. For instance, Tabellini (2019) and Sequeira, Nunn, & Qian (2020) show that immi-
gration brings about long-lasting economic benefits but deteriorates social cohesion at least in the short 
run. Haushofer and Fehr (2014) describe how poverty increases individuals’ risk aversion which could 
translate into lower levels of trust when dealing with strangers. Alesina and Giuliano (2015) delineate 
the interconnectedness between institutions and culture and a plethora of models have been developed 
to model this interaction (e.g., Nannicini et al., 2013). To address these identification issues, historic 
events which exogenously influenced variations in social capital shall be used as instruments. An apt 
instrument must exhibit a significant relation to the social capital measures but must simultaneously be 
irrelevant in explaining the proxies of economic development (that is the GNI/capita and the nighttime 
luminosity). In this thesis the haphazard colonial border demarcation and the slave trade serve as exog-
enous sources of variation in social capital.  
 
4.2.1. Ethnolinguistic Diversity 
Since borders in Africa were arbitrarily drawn by colonial officers without regard of ethnic home-
lands and religious allocation, African countries exhibit the highest degree of ethnic and religious 
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diversity. Many scholars believe that the propagation of social conflicts in Africa can be directly at-
tributed to African countries’ heterogeneity. Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005a), for example, dis-
covered that ethnic polarization is significantly correlated to the onset of civil wars. Esteban, Mayoral, 
and Ray (2012) corroborate these results finding that both ethnic fractionalization and polarization are 
strongly significant in explaining the incidence of social conflicts. If ethnic diversity can be attributed 
to civil wars, it is reasonable to assume that it is also associated with lower levels of generalized trust.  
Therefore, an index which measures the level of ethnic and religious heterogeneity of every subnational 
unit shall serve as an instrument for social capital. The data is provided by Gershman and Rivera (2018) 
who computed ethnic and religious fractionalization (ELF) and polarization (ELP) indices for 360 first-
level administrative units in 36 Sub-Saharan African nations18. Both indices assume values between zero 
and one where zero indicates that all individuals belong to the same ethnic group and one maximum 
diversity. Fractionalization is defined as the probability that two randomly chosen individuals belong to 
different ethno-linguistic groups. It can be computed as follows: 
 





where 𝒔𝑖(𝑗) is the share of group 𝑖 in the population which sums up to ∑ 𝒔𝑖 = 𝟏
𝑁
𝑖 = 1 . The more groups 
exist in a certain region, the higher is the fractionalization index. 
Polarization indices, instead, are based on the assumption of Horowitz (1985) that inter-group dif-
ferences are maximized when there is a limited number of relatively large groups. Consequently, polar-
ization measures are maximized when two same-sized groups are present and thereupon decrease with 
the number of same-sized groups. It is usually calculated using the formular developed by Montalvo 
and Reynal-Querol (2005a): 
 
𝑬𝑳𝑷 = 𝟒 ⋅ ∑(𝒔𝑖)




Earlier literature has linked ethnic and religious heterogeneity directly with economic growth and 
found negative correlations (e.g., Easterly & Levine, 1997; Alesina et al., 2003; Montalvo and Reynal-
Querol, 2005b). However, one must bear in mind the caveats of cross-country studies in general and 
that the standard indices treat all groups as equally distinct. To account for group similarities two ap-
proaches have gained increasing popularity. The first dates to Laitin (2000) and Fearon (2003) and uses 
linguistic distances between groups by comparing the relative positions of each two ethnolinguistic 
groups on the linguistic family tree determined through the number of branches the pair of languages 
shares. The fractionalization formula then becomes: 
 
18  Unfortunately, their study does not cover Burundi, Lesotho, Madagascar, Rwanda, and Sudan, so that this instrument reduces the sample 










and the polarization index turns to:  
 







where 𝝉𝑖𝑗 is the distance between the two groups 𝑖 and 𝑗. Fearon (2003) computes this distance using: 
 





where 𝒍 refers to the number of branches in the linguistic tree shared by languages 𝑖 and 𝑗, and 𝒎 is the 
maximum possible number of branches the two languages can share (equal to 13 in the case of Sub-
Saharan Africa). 𝜹 is a parameter which determines how quickly the distance between two groups de-
clines with an increasing number of shared branches. Thus, the importance of the linguistic distance 
between two groups increases as 𝜹 rises and in the limit, 𝐥𝐢𝐦
𝛿 → ∞
𝝉𝑖𝑗 becomes equal to one and the weighted 
fractionalization index converges to its basic version (4.2). Which value of 𝜹 to choose is subject of 
debates. Fearon (2003) chose a value of 𝜹 = 𝟎, 𝟓 while Desmet, Ortuño-Ortín, and Weber (2009) chose 
𝜹 = 𝟎, 𝟎𝟓. Gershman and Rivera (2018) provide fractionalization and polarization data for 19 different 
values of 𝜹 19. 
A second approach to account for inter-group differences is conceived by Desmet, Ortuño-Ortín, 
and Wacziarg (2012). They compute indices of fractionalization and polarization for every tier of each 
linguistic tree. By moving up the tree, more and more languages are aggregated until at the top, groups 
are only distinguished according to their language family. Thus, one can differentiate between deep and 
shallow linguistic cleavages. For example, Zambia exhibits high ethnic fractionalization at the most 
disaggregate level, but this heterogeneity vanishes completely when the different Bantu languages are 
lumped together. Nigeria, on the other hand, remains ethnically heterogenous even at levels of high 
aggregation as it lies on the border between the Afro-Asiatic, the Nilo-Saharan, and the Niger-Congo 
language family. Figure 4.1 shows the simplified distribution of languages in both countries. Gershman 
and Rivera (following the language trees constructed by the Ethnologue) distinguish 750 languages, six 
language families and up to eleven subdivisions in between. This makes 13 tiers in total for each of 





19  Ranging from 𝜹 = 𝟎. 𝟎𝟏 to 𝜹 = 𝟎. 𝟏 in steps of 0.01 and from 𝜹 = 𝟎. 𝟏 to 𝜹 = 𝟏 in steps of 0.1 
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Figure 4.1: Ethno-linguistic Diversity in Zambia and Nigeria.  
  
The figure portrays the linguistic diversity in Zambia and Nigeria at the language level. In both countries an abundance of different languages 
is spoken, however in Zambia they all are Bantu languages (depicted via blue colors) which belong to the Niger-Congo language family 
whereas the languages of Nigeria can be attributed to three distinct language families (Nilo-Saharan, Niger-Congo, Afro-Asiatic). Source: 
Own creation. 
 
When taking inter-group distances into account, the relationship between both ethnolinguistic di-
versity and social conflicts or income becomes clearer. First, Desmet, Ortuño-Ortín, and Wacziarg 
(2012) find that fractionalization and polarization are correlated with the indigence of social conflict at 
the most aggregate level. Thus, they shed light on the somewhat surprising results of Fearon and Laitin 
(2001) who have found no relation between the general fractionalization index and social conflict. Alt-
hough, shallow cleavages seem to be indeed irrelevant for social conflict, deep cleavages are not. There-
fore, one can expect that generalized trust should decrease with higher degrees of ethnic diversity. In 
addition, the same authors discover that the relationship between ethnic diversity and economic growth 
follows the exact opposite pattern, in that the effect of fractionalization rises with falling levels of lin-
guistic aggregation. Moreover, polarization seems to be not related at all to economic growth. Therefore, 
at deep levels of polarization, trust should be strongly impaired while economic growth should remain 
unaffected. Gershman and Rivera (2018) provide further evidence that the exclusion restriction is satis-
fied. Their estimations of all variants of the two indices of ethnolinguistic diversity with per-capita gross 
regional product (GRP) and the international wealth index (IWI) yields statistically insignificant effects 
which are small in magnitude. Altogether, ethnic heterogeneity – especially when measured via ethnic 
polarization at low levels of aggregation – should constitute valid instruments.  
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Figure 4.2 depicts the regional distribution of ethnic polarization indices at various stages of lin-
guistic aggregation. Panel (a) displays polarization at the most aggregate level, that is at the level of 
language families. Panel (b) to (d) differentiate between more and more languages and reveal increas-
ingly shallow ethnolinguistic cleavages. Panel (d) is the most disaggregate level, that is polarization at 
the level of languages. Panel (e) and (f) portray ethnic polarization using Fearon’s and Laitin’s method 
of distinguishing between language groups. Panel (e) uses a delta of 0.05 (as in the study of Desmet et 
al., 2009) indicating that the distance between two groups declines only slowly with an increasing num-
ber of shared branches in the language family tree, hence representing deeper cleavages. Panel (f) uses 
a delta of 0.5 (as in Fearon, 2003) which corresponds to a quicker convergence of groups, thus visual-
izing shallower cleavages. 
 
Figure 4.2: Regional Distribution of ethnic polarization indices. 
 
The figure shows the regional distribution of ethnic polarization indices at different levels of linguistic aggregation (panel (a) to (d)) and with 
different values of the parameter 𝛿 (panel (e) and (f)). Source: Gershman and Rivera (2018): Figure C.3. 
 
 
4.2.2. Distance to Slave Ports 
A second source of exogenous variation in trust is the slave trade. This approach is based on Nunn 
(2008) and Nunn and Wantchekon (2011). The slave trade lasted for a period of more than 400 years 
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and is believed to have created a culture of deep mistrust in Sub-Saharan Africa. Its dimension is un-
precedented and according to Manning (1990, p. 171) by 1850 Africa’s total population was only half 
of what it would have been without the slave trade taking place. It initially started with state organized 
raids which created a hostile and unsecure environment for individuals outside their local communities. 
However, as the demand for slaves soared, such local communities became insecure themselves because 
of the slave trade’s perfidious feature that individuals could gain some sort of protection by selling others 
into slavery in exchange for weapons. This vicious cycle of kidnapping slaves and selling them for 
weapons to defend oneself, perpetuated the slave trade and its environment of insecurity. As individuals 
assaulted, betrayed, kidnapped, and turned in their own kin, neighbors, and friends, norms of mistrusting 
everyone even those closest to you evolved. Nunn and Wantchekon (2011) find empirical evidence for 
this relationship between the slave trade and low levels of trust in Africa by ascertaining that ethnic 
groups which were more severely exposed to the slave trade are particularly low trusting today. Models 
of intergenerational cultural transmission like those presented in section 2.2 (Bisin & Verdier, 2001; 
Tabellini, 2008; Guiso et al., 2008) demonstrate how a culture of distrust can linger on over centuries 
and survive until today. Besides the well-known transatlantic slave trade, in which approximately 12 
million slaves from all over Africa were shipped to the plantations of the Americas, three further slave 
trade patterns existed. In the Trans-Saharan slave trade, slaves from beyond the Sahara were brought to 
North Africa. The Red Sea slave trade conveyed people from Africa to the Middle East and India. The 
Indian Ocean slave trade too shipped slaves to India and the Middle East but also to plantation islands 
in the Indian Ocean. Taken together, these three slave trades have enslaved another 6 million people. 
Nunn (2009) finds a robust negative relationship between the number of slaves exported from each 
country and its current economic performance. In order to preclude that the negative relationship is 
caused by reversed causality, that is already poor regions were more inclined to select into the slave 
trade, the author employs an instrument variable approach. By using the sailing distance to the nearest 
location of slave demand in each of the four slave trades to represent how much a country was exposed 
to it, he ensures that the slave trade is responsible for the poor state of development. The same instrument 
shall be used in this thesis. The idea is that a region which was strongly affected by the slave trade, is 
less trusting today following the results of Nunn and Wantchekon (2011). The distance of each region’s 
capital to the closest location of slave demand shall serve as proxy for that region’s exposure to each of 
the four slave trades. Following Nunn (2009), the instrument’s validity hinges upon the assumption that 
slave traders procured slaves from locations that were relatively close to the major demand centers. Take 
for example the Caribbean plantations. It seems more reasonable that slaves on Caribbean plantations 
were taken from Western Africa due to its proximity rather than to assume that plantations were estab-
lished in the Caribbean because the West African slave supply was close. Nunn argues that the location 
of slave demand was determined by factors unrelated to the slave supply, for example the deposit of 
gold and silver in South America, climates suitable for sugar, tobacco, or cotton production in the 
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Caribbean, the southern states of the US, and isles in the Indian Ocean. In the Middle East and North 
Africa slaves were demanded as workers in salt mines and in the Red Sea as pearl divers.  
The locations of slave demand are the same as in Nunn (2009) who uses data on slave imports from 
Eltis and Richardson (2006) to determine the biggest slave markets. Indian and Atlantic Ocean slave 
trade hubs are generally reached by ship, whereas the centers of the Red Sea and the Trans-Saharan 
slave trade are reached overland. Unlike Nunn (2009) who uses only the sailing distance from the point 
on the coast that is closest to the centroid of a landlocked country to the slave demand overseas, this 
thesis sums the sailing distance from Africa and the distance of each landlocked capital to the nearest 
coast. The reason for this is that countries far away from the coast were more difficult to reach for slave 
hunters and hence they were less exposed to the slave trade. Omitting the distance to the coast would 
neglect this difference between landlocked and shoreside regions. Therefore, the four instruments are: 
1. The distance of each region’s capital to the major slave markets of the Atlantic slave trade:  
Virginia, USA; Havana, Cuba; Port-au-Price, Haiti; Kingston, Jamaica; Dominica; Martinique; 
Guyana; Salvador, Brazil; and Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. 
2. The distance of each region’s capital to the major slave markets of the Indian Ocean slave trade: 
Mauritius; and Muscat, Oman  
3. The distance of each region’s capital to the major slave markets of the Trans-Saharan slave 
trade: Algiers, Algeria; Tunis, Tunisia; Benghazi, Libya; and Cairo, Egypt. 
4. The distance of each region’s capital to the major slave markets of the Red Sea slave trade:  
Massawa, Eritrea; Suakin, Sudan; and Djibouti. 
 
Figure 4.3: Example showing the distance instruments for Oyo, Nigeria with its capital Ibadan.  
 
The figure illustrates the distance instruments for Oyo, Nigeria. Its capital Ibadan is closest to Salvador, Brazil in the Transatlantic slave trade, to 
Mauritius in the Indian Ocean slave trade, to Tripoli, Libya in the Trans-Saharan slave trade and to Suakin, Sudan, in the Red Sea slave trade. Source: 




The instruments are illustrated for Oyo State in Nigeria. Its capital Ibadan is closest to Salvador, 
Brazil in the transatlantic slave trade, to Mauritius in the Indian Ocean slave trade, to Tripoli, Libya in 
the Trans-Saharan slave trade, and to Suakin, Sudan in the Red Sea slave trade. As the figure shows, 
sailing ships must circumnavigate the Cape of Good Hope to reach the other side of Africa. Since the 
Suez Canal was only opened in 1869, when the slave trade was already in retreat, all ships must pass 
the Cape of Good Hope to reach the other coastline of Africa. Unlike Nunn (2009) the distance from 
Ibadan to the Nigerian coast is included when computing the distance to slave demand centers in the 
Indian and Atlantic Ocean slave trade.  
The distances are great circle distances computed with the central subtended angle method which 
takes the curvature of the earth into account. The method first calculates the azimuth – the angle, 𝜶, 
between the two vectors that connect the center of the earth with the two respective locations using: 
 
𝜶 = 𝐜𝐨𝐬−𝟏(𝐬𝐢𝐧 𝝋𝑖 ⋅ 𝐬𝐢𝐧 𝝋𝑗 + 𝐜𝐨𝐬 𝝋𝑖 ⋅ 𝐜𝐨𝐬 𝝋𝑗 ⋅ 𝐜𝐨𝐬 𝚫 𝜼𝑖𝑗) (4.7) 
Where 𝝋𝑖 is the latitude of region 𝑖 in degrees and 𝜼𝑖𝑗 is longitude of regions 𝑖 and 𝑗. To then obtain the 
great circle distance, 𝒅𝑖𝑗, between the two regions, the angle, 𝜶, is inserted in the following formular: 
 




Where 𝒓𝒆 is the radius of the earth, which amounts to approximately 6,371 kilometers.  
 
5. Results  
The following section presents the estimation results. The first part describes the results of the 
standard OLS estimation, part two and three the IV estimations using ethnolinguistic diversity and the 
distance to slave ports as instruments, respectively.  
 
5.1. OLS Results  
At first, the relationship between trust and GNI/capita is estimated using standard OLS procedure. 
All specifications account for country-fixed effects. Table 5.1 reports the results of the estimation equa-
tion (4.1) in which 𝑿′𝑐𝑖 contains various control measures
20. Colum 1 shows the simple correlation be-
tween generalized trust and GNI/capita. Surprisingly, the correlation is negative in that an increase in 
average generalized trust by ten percentage point is associated with a decrease in GNI/capita of circa 
3.82%21. Nevertheless, the estimator is biased due to omitted variables and moreover relatively impre-
cise. Including the urbanization rate (column 2), climatic controls (column 5), or controls for natural 
 
20  The full table with coefficients of all control variables can be found in the appendix (table 8.3).  
21  A region’s generalized trust was measured in decimal numbers and not in percent. Natural logarithms were applied to GNI/capita. There-
fore, the interpretation is as follows: 
%𝚫𝒚 =  𝟏𝟎𝟎 ⋅ (𝒆−𝟎.𝟑𝟖𝟗𝟓 ⋅ 𝟎.𝟏 − 𝟏) = −𝟑. 𝟖𝟐% 
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resources (column 6) in the vector 𝑿′𝑐𝑖 the same negative relationship occurs. However, the signs flip 
when controlling for general geographic determinants (column 4) and as soon as educational controls 
(column 3 and 8) are included. When all controls are included, trust has the expected positive effect in 
that an increase of ten percentage points would lead to an increase in income of 0.71%. This implies that 
a low-trusting region like Rivercess county in Liberia could raise its income levels by 5.4% if it had the 
same trust level as Denmark and by almost 3% if it were as trusting as Germany22. Nevertheless, the 
estimator remains relatively imprecise. The 95%-confidence interval straddles values from -0.1917511 
to 0.3336938 so that the estimator could possibly even be negative or zero. Moreover, the estimation 
has not yet accounted for potential issues of endogeneity and could hence still be biased. Nevertheless, 
the OLS results suggest that other factors like urbanization and mean schooling, annual precipitations, 
and average humidity seem to play a bigger role in determining a region’s economic performance. More-
over, some natural resource deposits (iron, precious metals) are positively, others (base metals) nega-
tively associated with regional per-capita income.  
 
Table 5.1: Generalized trust and economic development within countries: OLS estimates. 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 












Generalized trust -.3895 -.0974 .1853 .036 -.3205 -.4169 -.0884 .071 
   (.3307) (.3117) (.1843) (.2715) (.2183) (.3408) (.184) (.1285) 
         
Observations 334 334 334 334 334 334 334 334 
Country FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
R-squared .8167 .9071 .9309 .8734 .8352 .8233 .9281 .9562 
The table reports OLS estimates of regressions of ln(GNI/capita) on generalized trust. The unit of observation is a region. In column (1) no 
additional controls were included, while columns (2) to (8) add the control variables indicated in the top row. All regressions include country fixed 
effects. Robust standard errors, adjusted for clustering at the country-level, are reported below coefficients in parentheses. Asterisks denote levels 
of statistical significance (*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1). 
 
5.2. IV Results 
To rule out reversed causality, this thesis uses the instrument variables method. A valid instrument 
causes changes in the explicative variable, that is generalized trust, without independently affecting 
economic development. Two possible instruments are conceived. The first exploits the haphazard colo-
nial border demarcation, the second the slave trade as exogenous sources of variation in social capital. 
In the following section, first-stage and reduced form results for both instruments are presented.  
 
5.2.1. Ethnolinguistic Diversity 
As explained in the previous section deeper cleavages between ethnic groups should affect trust 
more than shallow cleavages. The data confirms this intuition. Typically, the relationship drops in sig-
nificance after the second level of linguistic disaggregation (using the approach of Desmet et al., 2012) 
or after δ = 0.06 (following Fearon, 2003). Both polarization and fractionalization indices à la Desmet 
 
22  Rivercess in one of the regions, in which no interviewee responded that people can generally be trusted. Denmark is (according to the 
latest wave of the WVS) the highest trusting country in the world. 73.9% of the Danish people say that they generally trust others. In 
Germany, 41.6% of the people believe that most people can be trusted.  
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et al. perform better in terms of joint significance than the indices of Fearon where δ is somewhat arbi-
trarily chosen. Fractionalization exhibits the strongest relationship to trust at the first level of disaggre-
gation, that is at the level of whole language families. Polarization, instead, is most relevant at the second 
level of linguistic disaggregation. The first-stage results and the relevant F-statistic (in the case of clus-
tered standard errors the Kleinbergen-Paap Wald rk F-statistic) are displayed in table 5.2. As expected, 
both measures are negatively associated with trust in that an increase in fractionalization by ten percent-
age points reduces trust by approximately one percentage point. Hence, the magnitude of the effect is 
already small for fractionalization and only half for polarization. Moreover, neither instrument exhibits 
a large F-statistic. Both are quite far from Staiger’s and Stock’s (1997) threshold of 10. Therefore, one 
must conclude that both instruments are rather weak because they are not sufficiently related to trust 
itself. When both indices are simultaneously used as instruments, the F-statistic drops to 2.29 probably 
because they are highly correlated with one another and capture the same variation in trust.  
 
Table 5.2: Generalized trust and economic development within countries: IV results using indices 
of ethnolinguistic diversity.  
The table reports IV estimates of regressions of ln(GNI/capita) on generalized trust. The top panel reports the first-stage estimates, and the bottom 
panel reports second-stage estimates. The unit of observation is a region. Column (1) uses polarization at the second level of linguistic disaggregation, 
column (2) fractionalization at the first level of linguistic disaggregation as instrument. All regressions include country fixed effects and the complete 
set of educational and geographic controls presented in section 3. Robust standard errors, adjusted for clustering at the country-level, are reported 
below coefficients in parentheses. Asterisks denote levels of statistical significance (*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1). 
 
When interpretating the results of the corresponding IV estimation, one must bear in mind that the 
two instruments are weak and that they are furthermore likely to be correlated with education and thus 
are potentially biased. Unlike the OLS results of the corresponding specification (i.e., with the same set 
of control variables), the IV estimates are negative. This would imply that an increase in trust, decreases 
    (1) (2) 
 First Stage: Dependent variable is generalized trust 
Polarization at level 2 -.0497*  
   (.0283)  
Fractionalization at level 1  -.1028** 
    (.0513) 
   
Observations 270 270 
F-statistics 3.09 4.02 
Country Fixed Effects YES YES 
Control Variables YES  YES 
   
 Second Stage: Dependent variable is ln(GNI 2013) 
Polarization at level 2 -.5665  
   (1.4724)  
Fractionalization at level 1  -1.0464 
    (1.3034) 
   
Observations 270 270 
Country Fixed Effects YES YES 
Control Variables YES YES 
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regional economic development. Moreover, the magnitude of the effect increased: A raise in trust of ten 
percentage points is now associated with a decrease in GNI/capita of approximately 10%. However, this 
result is not very reliable because the estimator is now even less precise than in the OLS specification. 
In fact, the 95%-confidence intervals of both estimates reach into the positive part of the distribution. 
Using polarization as instruments results in a confidence interval that straddles values from circa -3.5 to 
1.5 while that using fractionalization spans from -3.5 to 2.3. Again, other factors seem to play a more 
important role in explaining regional variations in economic development. Urbanization, mean years of 
schooling, humidity, and natural resource deposits (iron, precious metals, base metals) remain statisti-
cally highly significant, whereas annual precipitation becomes statistically insignificant. Instead, terrain 
ruggedness exhibits a statistically relevant effect, which is however counterintuitive as the estimation 
suggest that it has a slightly positive effect on regional income23.  
 
5.2.2. Distance to Slave Ports 
If intuition is correct, then trust should increase with higher distances to slave ports. However, as 
the first-stage results in table 5.3 show, the distance to slave ports is in none of the slave trades statisti-
cally relevant. Moreover, the respective F-statistics are very low, indicating that the instrument is under-
identified, and that the relevance condition is not fulfilled. The Indian Ocean slave trade exhibits the 
highest F-statistics; however, the coefficient is negative which is contrary to the intuition that trust rises 
with distance to slave ports. It would suggest that an increase in the distance to Indian Ocean slave ports 
by one thousand kilometers is associated with a decrease in trust of 4 percentage points.  
Using these instruments simultaneously does not render better results as no combination of the 
distance instruments surpasses the F-statistic of the Indian Ocean. F-statistics improve when distance 
instruments are simultaneously used with indices of ethnic diversity. However, the corresponding F-











23  The complete table with all coefficients can be found in the appendix (table 8.4). 
24  Using ethnic fractionalization at stage one and either the distances to Atlantic or Red Sea slave ports yields F-statistics of 3.72 and 3.61, 
respectively. However, neither value surpasses the F-statistic (4.02) when ethnic fractionalization is used individually. 
31 
 
Table 5.3: Generalized trust and economic development within countries: IV results using dis-
tances to slave ports 
The table reports IV estimates of regressions of ln(GNI/capita) on generalized trust. The top panel reports the first-stage estimates, and the bottom 
panel reports second-stage estimates. The unit of observation is a region. Column (1) uses distances to slave ports in the Transatlantic slave trade, 
column (2) distances to slave ports in the Indian Ocean slave trade, column (3) distances to slave demand centers of the Trans-Saharan slave trade, 
and column (4) distances to slave demand centers of the Red Sea slave trade. All regressions include country fixed effects and the complete set of 
educational and geographic controls presented in section 3. Robust standard errors, adjusted for clustering at the country-level, are reported below 
coefficients in parentheses. Asterisks denote levels of statistical significance (*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1). 
 
Since the instruments are in no way related to generalized trust, one cannot draw any conclusion 
on how trust affects economic development. As before25, mean years of schooling and average humidity 
are highly statistically significant; urbanization, precious metals, and iron, however, lose their signifi-
cance. Base metals are only sometimes significantly negatively related to economic development.   
 
6. Robustness Checks 
To check how reliable these results are, the following section carries out various robustness checks. 
First, other trust dimensions, viz. trust in relatives, neighbors, and other people you know shall be in-
vestigated. Second, a high-trust dummy variable is created and its relation to economic development 
examined. Third, night-time luminosity is considered as further proxy of subnational development. It 
 
25  The complete table with coefficients to all control variables can be found in the appendix (table 8.5). 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 First Stage: Dependent variable is generalized trust 
Transatlantic slave trade .0107    
   (.0261)    
Indian Ocean slave trade  -.0478   
    (.0344)   
Trans-Saharan slave trade   .0204  
   (.0536)  
Red Sea slave trade    .0075 
    (.0535) 
     
Observations 334 334 334 334 
F-statistics .17 1.93 .15 .02 
Country Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES 
Control Variables YES  YES YES YES 
     
 Second Stage: Dependent variable is ln(GNI 2013) 
Transatlantic slave trade -1.6401    
   (5.5184)    
Indian Ocean slave trade  1.1568   
    (2.212)   
Trans-Saharan slave trade   -2.447  
   (7.3299)  
Red Sea slave trade    -2.8158 
    (18.7839) 
     
Observations 334 334 334 334 
Country Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES 
Control Variables YES YES YES YES 
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has gained popularity as regional or even local development measure in recent years sparked by the 
works of Henderson, Storeygard, and Weil (2012) and Michalopoulous and Papaioannou (2017). Light 
intensity data is available for 25 countries of those included in the Afrobarometer 2011/13 and is pro-
vided by Gershman and Rivera (2018). Fourth, Afrobarometer data on membership in voluntary associ-
ations and religious groups shall be used as an alternative proxy for social capital.  
 
6.1. Other trust dimensions 
The OLS results of the three other trust dimensions are reported in table 6.1. For the sake of com-
parability, the results of generalized trust are included in the fourth row. Like generalized trust, none of 
the other trust dimensions is significantly related to regional economic development. However, trust in 
neighbors and trust in other people is more precise than the other estimates. Both p-values are in the 
ballpark of 0.14, while generalized trust and trust in relatives exhibits p-values of around 0.59. The effect 
of trust is always positive. For example, an increase in trust in neighbors of ten percentage points raises 
per-capita income by approximately 1.3%26. This implies that Anambra State in Nigeria, where the least 
share of people indicate that they trust their neighbors, could increase its income level by almost 11% if 
it were as trusting as Iceland – the country where people trust their neighbors the most27. Therefore, 
Anambra State could reach a per-capita income of circa 11,31 US-$ (at Purchasing Power Parity) which 
would correspond to income levels of present-day Ecuador. If it were as trusting as Germany, Anambra 
State could raise its income by 7.6% to circa 10,96 US-$ (at PPP) surpassing that of present-day Namibia 
which would make Anambra State one of the richest regions in Africa 28. Although these values suggest 
that trust in neighbors (as well as trust in other people you know) has a sizeable effect on economic 
development, they are not statistically significant and are consequently relatively imprecise. Although, 
the corresponding 95%-confidence intervals are smaller than that of generalized trust ([-0.191; 0.334]), 
they are still quite large: [-0.040; 0.295] for trust in neighbors and [-0.050; 0.331] for trust in other 
people. Furthermore, these coefficients are OLS estimates and therefore do not account for potential 
endogeneity issues. As before29, significant factors of regional development are mean years of schooling, 





26  As for generalized trust, all other trust dimensions were measured in decimal numbers and not in percent. Natural logarithms were ap-
plied to GNI/capita. Therefore, the interpretation is as follows: 
%𝚫𝒚 =  𝟏𝟎𝟎 ⋅ (𝒆𝟎.𝟏𝟐𝟕𝟔 ⋅ 𝟎.𝟏 − 𝟏) = 𝟏. 𝟐𝟖% 
27  Anambra State in Nigeria is the region with the lowest share of people trusting their neighbors: 2.5%. In Iceland 84% of the people indi-
cate that they trust their neighborhood – the highest value in the world, while in Germany the share amounts to 60%. Therefore, the in-
terpretation in comparison to Iceland becomes: 
%𝚫𝒚 =  𝟏𝟎𝟎 ⋅ (𝒆𝟎.𝟏𝟐𝟕𝟔 ⋅ (𝟎.𝟖𝟒−𝟎.𝟎𝟐𝟓) − 𝟏) = 𝟏𝟎. 𝟗𝟔% 
28  GNI/capita in Anambra State amounts to 10,19$ (at PPP) in 2013. As of 2019, Ecuador has a GNI/capita of 11,54$ (at PPP) and Na-
mibia a GNI/capita of 9.78$ (at PPP) (World Bank). 
29  The complete table with coefficients for all control variables is again to be found in the appendix (table 8.6). 
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Table 6.1: Various trust dimensions and economic development within countries: OLS estimates. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Trust in relatives .035    
 (.0643)    
Trust in neighbors  .1276   
  (.0819)   
Trust in other people you know   .1404  
   (.0931)  
Generalized trust    .071 
    (.1285) 
     
Observations 322 334 334 334 
Country Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES 
Control Variables YES YES YES YES 
The table reports OLS estimates of regressions of ln(GNI/capita) on different dimensions of trust. The unit of observation is a region. Column (1) 
reports the coefficient that corresponds to trust in relatives, column (2) that corresponding to trust in neighbors, column (3) that corresponding to 
trust in other people you know. Column (4) is included for the sake of comparability and reports the OLS results for generalized trust. All regressions 
include country fixed effects and the complete set of educational and geographic controls presented in section 3. Robust standard errors, adjusted 
for clustering at the country-level, are reported below coefficients in parentheses. Asterisks denote levels of statistical significance (*** p < 0.01, ** 
p < 0.05, * p < 0.1). 
 
To account for potential endogeneity issues the same indices of ethnic diversity (ethnic polarization 
at stage 2 and ethnic fractionalization at stage 1) as above are used as instruments. The results of the 
first and second stage estimations are displayed in table 6.2. Again, ethnic fractionalization outperforms 
ethnic polarization in that its F-statistics are generally higher. Neither polarization nor fractionalization 
constitutes a valid instrument for trust in relatives since the corresponding F-statistics are quite low. 
Ethnic polarization is, furthermore, not a useful instrument for trust in neighbors either. However, ethnic 
fractionalization reaches a F-statistic of 8.52 which is substantially higher than that using generalized 
trust. Fractionalization (and to a lesser degree polarization as well) perform even better as instruments 
for trust in other people you know reaching an F-statistic of 11.27 (and 9.01, respectively) and therefore 
above (slightly below) Staiger’s and Stock’s (1997) threshold of 10. In addition, both F-statistics surpass 
the Stock-Yogo critical value with 15% of the maximal IV size which amounts to 8.96. As the instru-
ments are moreover statistically significant at the 1% level, they seem to fulfill the relevance condition. 
An increase in fractionalization at stage one of ten percentage points corresponds to a decline in trust of 
other people you know of almost 3 percentage points30. Altogether the IV estimates for trust in neighbors 
and trust in other people you know using fractionalization as instrument can be interpretated with more 
confidence. Again, using several instruments at once does not yield better F-statistics. Distances to slave 




30  Note that all trust dimensions as well as ethnic fractionalization and polarization are indicated in decimal numbers and not percent.  
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Table 6.2: Various trust dimensions and economic development within countries: IV results using 
indices of ethnolinguistic diversity. 
The table reports IV estimates of regressions of ln(GNI/capita) on different dimensions of trust.  The top panel reports the first-stage estimates, 
and the bottom panel reports second-stage estimates. The unit of observation is a region. Column (1) reports the coefficients that correspond to 
trust in relatives, column (2) those corresponding to trust in neighbors, column (3) those corresponding to trust in other people you know. Column 
(4) is included for the sake of comparability and reports the IV results for generalized trust. All regressions include country fixed effects and the 
complete set of educational and geographic controls presented in section 3. Robust standard errors, adjusted for clustering at the country-level, are 
reported below coefficients in parentheses. Asterisks denote levels of statistical significance (*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1). 
 
Like generalized trust, neither trust in other people you know nor trust in neighbors is statistically 
relevantly related to regional economic performance independent of the instrument applied. As with 
generalized trust, the signs of the trust coefficients flip and become negative so that an increase in trust 
in other people you know by ten percentage points would reduce regional GNI/capita by 3.56% (using 
fractionalization as instrument). However, once again these effects are quite imprecise: The 95%-confi-
dence interval spans from -1.396 to 0.671 and thus reaches far into the positive parts of the distribution31.  
 
6.2. High-trust Dummy 
As a further alternative measure of trust a dummy variable is created which become one if the 
respective region lies above the median value of generalized trust and zero otherwise. The same proce-
dure is followed for the other trust dimensions. The median values which serve as cutoffs are reported 
 
31  The appendix contains a table displaying the coefficients of all control variables included (table 8.7). 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Trust in relatives Trust in neigh-
bors 
Trust in other 
people you know 
Generalized trust 
 First Stage: Dependent variable the corresponding trust dimension 
Polarization at level 2 -.0193 -.0416 -.098*** -.0497* 
   (.0254) (.0284) (.0327) (.0283) 
Observations 270 270 270 270 
F-statistics 0.58 2.15 9.01 3.09 
     
Fractionalization at level 1 -.0669 -.1605*** -.2966*** -.1028* 
 (.0538) (.055) (.0883) (.0513) 
Observations 270 270 270 270 
F-statistics 1.55 8.52 11.27 4.02 
     
Country Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES 
Control Variables  YES  YES  YES  YES 
     
 Second Stage: Dependent variable is ln(GNI 2013) 
Polarization at level 2 -1.4612 -.6771 -.2874 -.5665 
   (4.2909) (1.842) (.7563) (1.4724) 
Fractionalization at level 1 -1.6092 -.6706 -.3628 -1.0464 
   (2.9426) (.9817) (.5273) (1.3034) 
     
Observations 270 270 270 270 
Country Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES 
Control Variables YES YES YES YES 
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in table 6.3. As expected, the median value is highest for trust in relatives and lowest for generalized 
trust.   
 
Table 6.3: Median values of all trust dimensions. 
Variable Obs. Median 
Trust in Relatives 323    .875 
Trust in Neighbors 335      .64   
Trust in other people you know 335   .4034091 
Generalized Trust 335     .1517857 
The table reports median values of all trust dimensions which will then serve as cutoffs for the respective dummy variables. 
 
The results of the OLS estimations using trust dummies as social capital proxy are reported in table 
6.432. Most dummy variables are not statistically significantly related to regional economic development. 
However, the dummy for trust in neighbor is unlike its standard measure significant at the 10% level. It 
suggests that if a region surpasses the median value of trust in neighbors (that is, the dummy becomes 
one), per-capita rises by 7.28%. This implies that if the Khomas region in Namibia surpassed the thresh-
old of 0.64, it would raise its per-capita income to circa 21,209 US-$ (at PPP) which corresponds to that 
of present-day Argentina33.  
 
Table 6.4: Various trust dummies and economic development within countries: OLS estimates. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Trust in relatives dummy .0527    
 (.0353)    
Trust in neighbors dummy  .0703*   
  (.0374)   
Trust in other people you know dummy   .0346  
   (.0296)  
Generalized trust dummy    .0418 
    (.033) 
     
Observations 322 334 334 334 
Country Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES 
Control Variables YES YES YES YES 
The table reports OLS estimates of regressions of ln(GNI/capita) on different trust dummies which become one if the respective region has a share 
of trusting people above the median value in the respective trust dimension and zero elsewise. The unit of observation is a region. Column (1) 
reports the coefficient that corresponds to the dummy of trust in relatives. Column (2) reports the coefficient corresponding to the dummy of trust 
in neighbors. Column (3) reports the coefficient corresponding to the dummy of trust in other people you know. Column (4) reports the coefficient 
corresponding to the dummy of generalized trust. All regressions include country fixed effects and the complete set of educational and geographic 
controls presented in section 3. Robust standard errors, adjusted for clustering at the country-level, are reported below coefficients in parentheses. 
Asterisks denote levels of statistical significance (*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1). 
 
Nevertheless, the estimate could be biased due to problems of endogeneity. Therefore, as before 
ethnic polarization at stage two and ethnic fractionalization at stage one serve as instruments. However, 
 
32  The complete table with all coefficients can be found in the appendix (table 8.8). 
33  Khomas, Namibia has had a per-capita GNI of 19,770$ (at PPP) in 2013. Argentina’s per-capita GNI as of 2019 amounts to 22,120$ (at 
PPP) (World Bank). 
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now both indices are transformed into dummy variables just like the trust variables before. They become 
one if a region is above the median ethnic fractionalization (polarization) and zero otherwise. The me-
dian values of both fractionalization at stage one and polarization at stage two are illustrated in table 6.5.  
 
Table 6.5: Median values of ethnic polarization and fractionalization. 
Variable Obs. Median 
Ethnic polarization at stage two 323    .875 
Ethnic fractionalization at stage one 335      .64   
The table reports median values of ethnic polarization at stage two and ethnic fractionalization at stage one which will then serve as cutoffs for the 
respective dummy variables. 
 
The results of the first- and second-stage estimations are found in table 6.6. Generally, the relation 
between the trust and the ethnic diversity dummies is less significant than the respective standard vari-
ables. The ethnic polarization dummy is most strongly correlated with the dummy for “trust in other 
people you know” and exhibits an F-statistic of 6.24. The ethnic fractionalization dummy has its strong-
est relationship with the “generalized trust” dummy. However, neither F-statistic surpasses the critical 
value of 10. Therefore, one must conclude that the instruments are weak even in these two more prom-
ising cases, making it difficult to draw any final conclusions. Nevertheless, as before the IV estimates 
are insignificant. In particular, the dummy for “trust in other people you know” instrumented with po-
larization does not significantly influence regional economic development. Unlike the unaltered version 
of trust in other people, the dummy has the expected positive sign. However, the coefficient is quite 
imprecise as the p-value amounts to 0.936 and the confidence interval stretches from -0.661 to 0.718. 
The same caveat applies to the coefficients of the “trust in neighbors” dummy (estimated via polariza-
tion) and that of the “generalized trust” dummy (estimated via fractionalization). The 95%-confidence 
interval in both cases comprises values of the opposite sign. All other estimates cannot be sensibly in-












34  The complete table with all coefficients can be found in the appendix (table 8.9). 
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Table 6.6: Various trust dummies and economic development within countries: IV results using 
indices of ethnolinguistic diversity. 
The table reports IV estimates of regressions of ln(GNI/capita) on different trust dummies which become one if the respective region has a share 
of trusting people above the median value in the respective trust dimension and zero elsewise. Both instruments, ethnic polarization at level two 
and ethnic fractionalization at level one, are equally turned into dummy variables so that they become one if a region is above the median ethnic 
polarization/fractionalization and zero elsewise. The top panel reports the first-stage estimates, and the bottom panel reports second-stage estimates. 
The unit of observation is a region. Column (1) reports the coefficient that corresponds to the dummy of trust in relatives. Column (2) reports the 
coefficient corresponding to the dummy of trust in neighbors. Column (3) reports the coefficient corresponding to the dummy of trust in other 
people you know. Column (4) reports the coefficient corresponding to the dummy of generalized trust. All regressions include country fixed effects 
and the complete set of educational and geographic controls presented in section 3. Robust standard errors, adjusted for clustering at the country-
level, are reported below coefficients in parentheses. Asterisks denote levels of statistical significance (*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1). 
 
6.3. Light-Intensity  
In this section night-time luminosity serves as an alternative proxy for regional development. The 
results of the OLS estimation of the relationship between the trust variables and night-time luminosity 
are reported in table 6.735. As for the OLS results with GNI/capita as dependent variable, none of the 
trust variables is statistically significantly related to light intensity at night. For trust in relatives and 
trust in neighbors the coefficient is counterintuitively negative in that an increase of trust in neighbors 
by ten percentage points reduces night-time luminosity by 3.5%. Trust in other people you know, and 
generalized trust exhibit the expected sign: An increase in generalized trust by ten percentage points, 
leads to a rise in night-time luminosity by approximately 0.63%36. As before, the estimates are quite 
imprecise. Generalized trust, for example, has a p-value of 0.912 and its 95%-confidence interval 
 
35  The complete table can be found in the appendix (table 8.10). 
36  Night-time luminosity is like per-capita GNI logarithmically transformed. Therefore, the interpretation is as follows: 
%𝚫𝒚 =  𝟏𝟎𝟎 ⋅ (𝒆𝟎.𝟎𝟔𝟑𝟐 ⋅ 𝟎.𝟏 − 𝟏) = 𝟎. 𝟔𝟑% 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) 




Trust in other 




 First Stage: Dependent variable the corresponding trust dummy 
Polarization at level 2 -.054 -.1254* -.1656** .0419 
   (.0524) (.0717) (.0663) (.0774) 
Observations 270 270 270 270 
F-statistics 1.06 3.06 6.24 .29 
     
Fractionalization at level 1 .0439 .1039 .006 .2367* 
 (.1264) (.0686) (.0824) (.1261) 
Observations 270 270 270 270 
F-statistics .12 2.29 0.01 3.52 
     
Country Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES 
Control Variables  YES  YES  YES  YES 
     
 Second Stage: Dependent variable is ln(GNI 2013) 
Polarization at level 2 .0869 .0374 .0284 -.1121 
   (1.0479) (.4521) (.3519) (1.3944) 
Fractionalization at level 1 -1.27 -.5361 -9.2302 -.2353 
   (3.3863) (.5586) (114.3232) (.2533) 
     
Observations 270 270 270 270 
Country Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES 
Control Variables YES YES YES YES 
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straddles values from -1.104 to 1.230. Therefore, the actual relationship could also be negative or non-
existent. The most accurate estimation is that for trust in neighbors where the p-value amounts to 0.170. 
However, even in this specification, the confidence interval [-1.237; 0.231] straddles positive and neg-
ative values. Moreover, endogeneity problems could bias the results. However, the so-far most promis-
ing instruments ethnic polarization at the second level and fractionalization at the first level of linguistic 
disaggregation both have been found to be significantly negatively related to night-time luminosity 
(Gershman & Rivera, 2018), thus failing the exclusion restriction. Since the weak first-stage results 
using distances to slave ports are unaltered, the endogeneity problem cannot be solved using the instru-
ments at hand. Therefore, one must stick to the correlations revealed by the OLS estimations. Other 
factors that play a larger role than trust in predicting patterns of night-time luminosity are not very 
surprisingly urbanization, the capital dummy, and land area. Urbanization and the capital dummy are 
both positively and highly statistically significantly associated to light intensity at night. Land area ex-
hibits a strong and highly significant negative coefficient probably because larger regions are often less 
populated (especially the large desert regions in Niger (Agadez), Mali (Timbuktu), and Sudan (Northern 
and North Darfur)) and are difficult to connect at whole with the electrical grid. The only natural re-
source which is positively related to night-time luminosity is oil and gas which is mostly found in the 
densely populated southern states of Nigeria.  
 
Table 6.7: Various trust dimensions and night-time luminosity: OLS estimates. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Trust in relatives -.3571    
 (.4154)    
Trust in neighbors  -.5029   
  (.3558)   
Trust in other people you know   .1742  
   (.4086)  
Generalized trust    .0632 
    (.5653) 
     
Observations 270 270 270 270 
Country Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES 
Control Variables YES YES YES YES 
The table reports OLS estimates of regressions of night-time luminosity on different dimensions of trust. The unit of observation is a region. 
Column (1) reports the coefficient that corresponds to trust in relatives, column (2) that corresponding to trust in neighbors, column (3) that 
corresponding to trust in other people you know, column (4) that corresponding to generalized trust. All regressions include country fixed effects 
and the complete set of educational and geographic controls presented in section 3. Robust standard errors, adjusted for clustering at the country-
level, are reported below coefficients in parentheses. Asterisks denote levels of statistical significance (*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1). 
 
6.4. Alternative Social Capital Proxy 
Another way of measuring social capital is through membership in groups or clubs. The Afroba-
rometer asks interviewees whether they are members of religious communities or voluntary groups. 
Respondents can choose between four answer possibilities: (i) “Not a Member”, (ii) “Passive Member”, 
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(iii) “Active Member”, and (iv) “Leader”. The individual answers were aggregated to the regional level 
and used to construct four variables of membership: Membership religious community lumps answer 
possibilities (ii), (iii), and (iv) together, Active Membership religious community aggregates (i) and (ii) 
as well as (iii) and (iv). The same procedure is followed for membership in voluntary associations cre-
ating the variables Membership voluntary association and Active membership voluntary association. 
The WVS asks similar questions with the same answer opportunities, however it does not include a 
question regarding membership in voluntary groups in general. Therefore, Rwanda and Ethiopia are 
only included in the sample when religious membership is considered.  
Table 6.8 provides the results of estimating the relationship between GNI/capita and group mem-
bership via OLS estimators37. Membership in religious or voluntary associations is just like trust only 
statistically insignificantly related to regional GN/capita differences. The magnitude of the effects is 
considerably lower than for trust: An increase in membership in religious communities of ten percentage 
points implies a rise in GNI/capita of 0.03%. If membership in voluntary associations climbs ten per-
centage point, GNI/capita falls by 0.3%38. Similarly, active membership in either religious communities 
or voluntary associations has a somewhat unexpected negative association with regional income varia-
tions. As before, these results must be treated with caution due to the inaccuracy of the estimates. 
Group membership is, however, statistically significant in explaining regional differences in night-
time luminosity. All membership variables besides active membership in religious communities have a 
relevant negative impact. For example, an increase in membership in religious communities leads to a 
fall in night-time luminosity by 10.5%. One can be quite sure that the effect is negative, as the 95%-
confidence intervals for all statistically relevant estimates straddle negative values only. However, as 
before, potential issues of endogeneity can bias the results. It seems more plausible that people in a 
region where access to electricity is limited spend more time together after dusk has fallen because 
private households cannot illuminate their homes and therefore gather in churches, mosques, club 
houses, etc. which are more likely to be connected to the electricity grid. However, neither indices of 










37  Table 8.11 provides the coefficients to all control variables. 
38  Like trust, all membership variables are indicated in decimal numbers and not percent.  
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Table 6.8: Group membership and proxies of regional economic development: OLS estimates. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
 GNI/capita 
Membership religious community .0032    
 (.095)    
Active membership in religious community  -.0737   
  (.1027)   
Membership in voluntary association   -.0309  
   (.0229)  
Active membership in voluntary association    -.026 
    (.1474) 
     
Observations 334 334 311 311 
Country Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES 
Control Variables YES YES YES YES 
     
 Night-time luminosity 
Membership religious community -1.1099**    
 (.4193)    
Active membership in religious community  -.2455   
  (.4367)   
Membership in voluntary association   -.3314**  
   (.1185)  
Active membership in voluntary association    -1.2654** 
    (.4553) 
     
Observations 270 270 259 259 
Country Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES 
Control Variables YES YES YES YES 
The table reports OLS estimates of regressions of night-time luminosity and ln(GNI/capita) on different group membership variables. The top 
panel reports the OLS results of regressions of ln(GNI/capita) on group membership, the bottom panel reports OLS results of regression of night-
time luminosity on group membership. The unit of observation is a region. Column (1) reports the coefficient that corresponds to membership in 
religious communities, column (2) that corresponding to active membership in religious communities, column (3) that corresponding to membership 
in voluntary associations, column (4) that corresponding to active membership in voluntary associations. All regressions include country fixed effects 
and the complete set of educational and geographic controls presented in section 3. Robust standard errors, adjusted for clustering at the country-
level, are reported below coefficients in parentheses. Asterisks denote levels of statistical significance (*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1). 
 
7. Conclusion 
Social capital is believed to have a benevolent effect on economic development. Putnam hypothe-
sized that it determines how the same nationwide institutions function at the regional level. Various 
empirical studies (Beugelsdijk & van Schaik, 2005; Neira et al., 2009; Tabellini, 2010) have shown that 
social capital has indeed a positive association with regional economic performance in Europe. This 
thesis investigated whether this relationship also persists in the developing countries. Using data from 
335 subdivisional units in Sub-Saharan Africa, it estimated the relationship between trust and per-capita 
GNI.  
Standard OLS estimations found that generalized trust is insignificantly positively correlated with 
per-capita income, whereas the relationship becomes negative in IV estimations using indices of ethnic 
polarization and fractionalization as instruments (remaining statistically insignificant though). However, 
both instruments are weak in that they are insufficiently related to generalized trust. This problem is 
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even more prevalent when using distances to slave ports which exhibits no relation to trust at all. There-
fore, all results must be interpreted with great caution. Since neither generalized trust nor other trust 
dimensions, trust dummies, or group membership are significantly correlated with economic develop-
ment (whether measured via GNI/capita or night-time luminosity), it seems likely that social capital 
does not play a decisive role in explaining Sub-Saharan Africa’s regional differences in economic per-
formance. Other factors appear to be more important. As shown by Gennaioli, La Porta, Lopez-de-
Silanes, and Shleifer (2013) education as measured by mean years of schooling exhibits a strong positive 
relationship. So does urbanization, although the direction of causality might be reversed. Moreover, like 
in Mitton (2016) some geographic factors seem to influence regional development: in particular, a re-
gion’s average humidity and natural resource endowments. While higher annual humidity as well as 
iron and precious metal deposits are often positively associated with economic performance, an abun-
dance of base metals is rather negatively related to per-capita income. Social capital, however, does not 
influence regional economic performance significantly.  
Nevertheless, the last word has not yet been spoken. The results presented in this thesis are mere 
correlation and do not claim to represent causal effects as both sets of instruments – indices of ethnic 
diversity and distances to slave ports – are too weak. Future research should focus on finding more 
suitable instruments to resolve potential endogeneity issues and thus obtain unbiased estimates. Using 
panel data could facilitate the search of instruments. However, the Afrobarometer survey has until now 
asked the generalized trust question only twice (in wave three (2005/06) and wave five (2011/13) used 
in this thesis). Ideally, future waves of the Afrobarometer surveys should reintroduce the generalized 
trust question so that one can study how trust evolves over time and use an exogenous trust shock as 



















Table 8.1: Correlation matrix of Social Capita proxies. 
 Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) 
(1) Generalized Trust 1.000 
(2) Trust in Relatives 0.270 1.000 
(3) Trust in Neighbors 0.373 0.808 1.000 
(4) Trust in other people you know 0.317 0.637 0.836 1.000 
     
(1) Religion Member 1.000    
(2) Religion Active Member 0.392 1.000   
(3) Voluntary Member 0.590 0.342 1.000  
(4) Voluntary Active Member 0.856 0.608 0.505 1.000 
The table shows the correlations between the different proxies of social capital. The top panel reports the correlations between the different trust 
dimensions, the bottom panel the correlations between the different membership variables. 
 
Table 8.2: Correlation matrix of regional development proxies. 
  Variables (1) (2) 
 (1) GNI/capita (in thousand US-$) 1.000 
 (2) ln Light Intensity 0.511 1.000 


























Table 8.3: Economic development and generalized trust: OLS estimates. 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
     Urbanization Education Basic Geography Climate Natural resources All Geography All controls 
Social capital proxy 
Generalized trust -.3895 -.0974 .1853 .036 -.3205 -.4169 -.0884 .071 
   (.3307) (.3117) (.1843) (.2715) (.2183) (.3408) (.184) (.1285) 
Human geography 
Urbanization  1.0591***     .8538*** .3743*** 
    (.1318)     (.1196) (.1197) 
Education 
Expected schooling   -.0224     -.0112 
     (.0217)     (.013) 
Mean schooling   .1836***     .1448*** 
     (.0228)     (.018) 
Literacy rate   -.0394     .0855 
     (.1735)     (.1484) 
General geography 
Latitude    -.0001   -.0131 .0134 
      (.0143)   (.011) (.0093) 
Longitude    .0005   .0049 .0164** 
      (.0139)   (.0079) (.0076) 
Landlock    -.1379**   -.0801 -.0106 
      (.0615)   (.0518) (.0365) 
Capital    .4075***   .1198* .0092 
      (.09)   (.0635) (.0392) 
Land area    -.0857**   -.0363 -.0139 
      (.0372)   (.0308) (.0209) 
Elevation    -.0485**   -.0124 0 
      (.0198)   (.0236) (.0165) 
Terrain ruggedness    .0008   .0006 .0003 
      (.0009)   (.0008) (.0007) 
Climate 
Temperature     -.0075  -.0074 -.0021 
       (.0098)  (.0079) (.0031) 
Precipitation     -.1361*  -.1073* -.066** 
       (.0751)  (.0594) (.0279) 
Temperature range     -.0159  .0115 -.0003 
       (.0203)  (.0155) (.0137) 
Precipitation range     -.0002  -.0001 -.0001 
       (.0003)  (.0001) (.0001) 
Sunshine     -.0591**  -.0393** .0126 
       (.0262)  (.0175) (.0148) 
Humidity     .0894***  .0543*** .0525*** 
       (.0095)  (.0111) (.01) 
Rain days     .0011  .0004 -.0003 
       (.0011)  (.0007) (.0005) 
Windspeed     .0078  .0035 .0051 
       (.008)  (.0034) (.0033) 
Natural resources 
Oil & Gas      .0038*** .0018* -.0006 
        (.0003) (.001) (.0008) 
Diamonds      .0009 -.0147 -.0019 
      (.0317) (.0193) (.0123) 
Precious metals      .0004 .0012 .0011* 
        (.0009) (.0007) (.0007) 
Base metals      .0303 -.1742* -.1821** 
      (.1278) (.0886) (.0821) 
Iron       .558*** .3669** .2279** 
      (.1728) (.1485) (.0967) 
Alloys      -.1272 -.1053 -.0645 
        (.2692) (.1217) (.1226) 
         
_cons .7103*** .2061 .2913 1.5822*** 2.1023*** .7159*** 1.8478*** .4934 
   (.1079) (.125) (.2509) (.349) (.5878) (.1111) (.6554) (.3163) 
         
Observations 335 334 334 334 334 334 334 334 
R-squared .8161 .9071 .9309 .8872 .8396 .8233 .9316 .957 
Country FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
The table reports OLS estimates of regressions of ln(GNI/capita) on generalized trust. The unit of observation is a region. In column (1) no 
additional controls were included, while columns (2) to (8) add the control variables indicated in the top row. All regressions include country fixed 
effects. Robust standard errors, adjusted for clustering at the country-level, are reported below coefficients in parentheses. Asterisks denote levels 









Table 8.4: Economic Development and generalized trust: IV estimates with ethnic diversity 
 (1) (2) 
 Ethnic Polarization at stage 2 Ethnic Fractionalization at stage 1 
Social capital proxy   
Generalized trust -.5665 -1.0464 
   (1.4724) (1.3034) 
Human geography   
Urbanization .4466*** .437*** 
   (.1146) (.1187) 
Education   
Expected schooling -.0218 -.031 
   (.0307) (.0274) 
Mean schooling .1388*** .142*** 
   (.0208) (.0196) 
Literacy rate .0249 .0016 
   (.1578) (.1315) 
General geography   
Latitude .0136 .011 
   (.0111) (.0109) 
Longitude .0177* .0199* 
   (.0093) (.0102) 
Landlock -.0135 -.0003 
   (.0527) (.0507) 
Capital -.0552 -.0504 
   (.0496) (.0554) 
Land area -.0142 -.0105 
   (.0257) (.0256) 
Elevation .0094 .007 
   (.0221) (.0241) 
Terrain ruggedness .0012* .001** 
   (.0006) (.0005) 
Climate   
Temperature .0007 -.0007 
   (.0074) (.0083) 
Precipitation -.0318 -.0253 
   (.0313) (.0281) 
Temperature range -.0061 -.0011 
   (.0142) (.0122) 
Precipitation range -.0002 -.0002 
   (.0001) (.0002) 
Sunshine .0001 -.0005 
   (.0134) (.0146) 
Humidity .0529*** .0525*** 
   (.0102) (.0111) 
Rain days -.0007 -.0008 
   (.0007) (.0008) 
Windspeed .0066 .0076 
   (.0043) (.0052) 
Natural resources   
Oil & Gas .0004 .0009 
   (.0018) (.0018) 
Diamonds -.0062 -.0128 
 (.0231) (.0226) 
Precious metals .0015** .0014*** 
   (.0006) (.0005) 
Base metals -.2129*** -.2098*** 
 (.0762) (.072) 
Iron  .2669** .3041*** 
 (.1203) (.1123) 
Alloys -.1481 -.1903 
   (.1742) (.1541) 
   
_cons .635 .859 
   (.762) (.721) 
   
Observations 270 270 
R-squared .958 .9486 
All Control Variables YES YES 
Country Fixed Effects YES YES 
The table reports second-stage IV estimates of regressions of ln(GNI/capita) on generalized trust. The unit of observation is a region. Column (1) 
uses polarization at the second level of linguistic disaggregation, column (2) fractionalization at the first level of linguistic disaggregation as instru-
ment. All regressions include country fixed effects and the complete set of educational and geographic controls presented in section 3. Robust 
standard errors, adjusted for clustering at the country-level, are reported below coefficients in parentheses. Asterisks denote levels of statistical 




Table 8.5: Economic Development and generalized trust: IV estimates with distances to slave ports 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 




Red Sea slave trade 
Social capital proxy     
Generalized trust -1.6401 1.1568 -2.447 -2.8158 
   (5.5184) (2.212) (7.3299) (18.7839) 
Human geography     
Urbanization .4923 .2995* .5479 .5733 
   (.4307) (.1599) (.5413) (1.2557) 
Education     
Expected schooling -.0297 .0005 -.0384 -.0424 
   (.0611) (.025) (.0843) (.2105) 
Mean schooling .135*** .1511*** .1303** .1282 
   (.0387) (.0283) (.0527) (.1073) 
Literacy rate .0842 .0864 .0836 .0833 
   (.1539) (.1828) (.2021) (.2281) 
General geography     
Latitude -.0096 .028 -.0204 -.0253 
   (.0805) (.0361) (.091) (.2456) 
Longitude .0231 .0122 .0262 .0277 
   (.0211) (.011) (.0314) (.0743) 
Landlock .0367 -.0406 .059 .0692 
   (.1609) (.0934) (.2159) (.5273) 
Capital -.0059 .0187 -.013 -.0162 
   (.0823) (.0444) (.0984) (.1743) 
Land area .0087 -.0282 .0194 .0242 
   (.0779) (.0242) (.0976) (.2467) 
Elevation -.0166 .0105 -.0244 -.0279 
   (.0625) (.0303) (.0711) (.1823) 
Terrain ruggedness 0 .0005 -.0001 -.0002 
   (.0012) (.0009) (.0014) (.0035) 
Climate     
Temperature -.0086 .002 -.0116 -.013 
   (.0229) (.0083) (.0273) (.0695) 
Precipitation -.1069 -.0401 -.1261 -.135 
   (.1641) (.0507) (.1449) (.4178) 
Temperature range .0391 -.0253 .0577 .0662 
   (.1383) (.054) (.157) (.4229) 
Precipitation range -.0003 -.0001 -.0003 -.0003 
   (.0004) (.0002) (.0005) (.0011) 
Sunshine .0118 .0132 .0113 .0112 
   (.0174) (.0143) (.0228) (.0278) 
Humidity .0532*** .052*** .0536*** .0537*** 
   (.013) (.0085) (.0158) (.0182) 
Rain days 0 -.0005 .0001 .0002 
   (.0013) (.0006) (.0013) (.003) 
Windspeed .0116 .0009 .0147 .0162 
   (.0225) (.0086) (.0273) (.0698) 
Natural resources     
Oil & Gas .0016 -.002 .0026 .0031 
   (.0069) (.0028) (.0096) (.0241) 
Diamonds -.0455 .0257 -.066 -.0754 
 (.1461) (.0533) (.1791) (.4695) 
Precious metals .0009 .0013 .0008 .0008 
   (.001) (.0008) (.001) (.0024) 
Base metals -.2035** -.1685** -.2136 -.2182 
 (.0964) (.0838) (.135) (.2588) 
Iron  .4473 .0886 .5508 .5981 
 (.719) (.323) (.9464) (2.3948) 
Alloys -.1144 -.0329 -.1379 -.1486 
   (.2191) (.1345) (.2613) (.5599) 
     
_cons 1.4435 -.1095 1.8914 2.0963 
   (3.2579) (1.3455) (3.9726) (10.4019) 
     
Observations 334 334 334 334 
R-squared .9138 .9396 .8635 .8341 
All Control Variables YES YES YES YES 
Country Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES 
The table reports second-stage IV estimates of regressions of ln(GNI/capita) on generalized trust. The unit of observation is a region. Column (1) 
uses distances to slave ports in the Transatlantic slave trade, column (2) distances to slave ports in the Indian Ocean slave trade, column (3) distances 
to slave demand centers of the Trans-Saharan slave trade, and column (4) distances to slave demand centers of the Red Sea slave trade. All regressions 
include country fixed effects and the complete set of educational and geographic controls presented in section 3. Robust standard errors, adjusted 
for clustering at the country-level, are reported below coefficients in parentheses. Asterisks denote levels of statistical significance (*** p < 0.01, ** 
p < 0.05, * p < 0.1). 
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Table 8.6: Economic Development and various trust dimensions: OLS estimates 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Trust in relatives Trust in neighbors Trust in other people 
you know 
Generalized trust 
Social capital proxy     
Respective Trust Dimension .035 .1276 .1404 .071 
   (.0643) (.0819) (.0931) (.1285) 
Human geography     
Urbanization .3639*** .3728*** .3753*** .3743*** 
   (.1184) (.1165) (.1169) (.1197) 
Education     
Expected schooling -.0108 -.0117 -.0113 -.0112 
   (.0128) (.0131) (.0131) (.013) 
Mean schooling .1447*** .1473*** .1452*** .1448*** 
   (.0168) (.0177) (.0175) (.018) 
Literacy rate .0868 .097 .0898 .0855 
   (.1398) (.1462) (.1486) (.1484) 
General geography     
Latitude .0129 .0133 .0134 .0134 
   (.0101) (.01) (.0098) (.0093) 
Longitude .0166** .0164** .0161** .0164** 
   (.0079) (.0075) (.0075) (.0076) 
Landlock -.0086 -.0128 -.0094 -.0106 
   (.0349) (.0348) (.0347) (.0365) 
Capital -.0079 .0131 .0125 .0092 
   (.0375) (.0391) (.0399) (.0392) 
Land area -.0161 -.0125 -.014 -.0139 
   (.0201) (.0203) (.0206) (.0209) 
Elevation .0008 -.0005 -.0007 0 
   (.0171) (.0169) (.0174) (.0165) 
Terrain ruggedness .0003 .0003 .0003 .0003 
   (.0007) (.0007) (.0007) (.0007) 
Climate     
Temperature -.0023 -.002 -.0023 -.0021 
   (.0037) (.0032) (.0033) (.0031) 
Precipitation -.0725** -.0623** -.0667** -.066** 
   (.0301) (.0282) (.028) (.0279) 
Temperature range .0001 -.0008 .0001 -.0003 
   (.0148) (.0141) (.0142) (.0137) 
Precipitation range -.0002 -.0002 -.0002 -.0001 
   (.0001) (.0001) (.0001) (.0001) 
Sunshine .0128 .0115 .0114 .0126 
   (.0152) (.0143) (.0144) (.0148) 
Humidity .0526*** .0513*** .0514*** .0525*** 
   (.0101) (.0104) (.0108) (.01) 
Rain days -.0003 -.0003 -.0002 -.0003 
   (.0005) (.0005) (.0005) (.0005) 
Windspeed .0055 .0056* .0057* .0051 
   (.0033) (.0032) (.0032) (.0033) 
Natural resources     
Oil & Gas -.0004 -.0005 -.0005 -.0006 
   (.0008) (.0008) (.0008) (.0008) 
Diamonds -.0038 -.0022 -.0022 -.0019 
 (.0119) (.0124) (.0126) (.0123) 
Precious metals .0011* .0012* .0012* .0011* 
   (.0006) (.0007) (.0007) (.0007) 
Base metals -.1552* -.1832** -.1889** -.1821** 
 (.0815) (.0843) (.0839) (.0821) 
Iron  .2181** .2304** .2618** .2279** 
 (.0982) (.0951) (.0976) (.0967) 
Alloys -.2027 -.0587 -.0535 -.0645 
   (.1456) (.123) (.1262) (.1226) 
     
_cons 1.4435 -.1095 1.8914 2.0963 
   (3.2579) (1.3455) (3.9726) (10.4019) 
     
Observations 322 334 334 334 
R-squared .9572 .9573 .9574 .957 
All Control Variables YES YES YES YES 
Country Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES 
The table reports OLS estimates of regressions of ln(GNI/capita) on different dimensions of trust. The unit of observation is a region. Column (1) 
reports the coefficient that corresponds to trust in relatives, column (2) that corresponding to trust in neighbors, column (3) that corresponding to 
trust in other people you know. Column (4) is included for the sake of comparability and reports the OLS results for generalized trust. All regressions 
include country fixed effects and the complete set of educational and geographic controls presented in section 3. Robust standard errors, adjusted 
for clustering at the country-level, are reported below coefficients in parentheses. Asterisks denote levels of statistical significance (*** p < 0.01, ** 
p < 0.05, * p < 0.1). 
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Table 8.7: Economic Development and various trust dimensions: IV estimates 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 




Trust in other peo-
ple 




Trust in other peo-
ple 
 Instrument: Polarization at stage 2  Fractionalization at stage 1 
Social capital proxy 
Resp. Trust Dim. -1.4612 -.6771 -.2874  -1.6092 -.6706 -.3628 
   (4.2909) (1.842) (.7563)  (2.9426) (.9817) (.5273) 
Human geography 
Urbanization .5261* .4937** .4617***  .533** .4934*** .4627*** 
   (.2865) (.1973) (.1335)  (.2293) (.166) (.1327) 
Education        
Expected schooling -.0142 -.017 -.0148  -.0145 -.0169 -.0159 
   (.0185) (.021) (.016)  (.0184) (.0172) (.0159) 
Mean schooling .1113* .1224*** .1346***  .1089** .1226*** .1345*** 
   (.067) (.0407) (.019)  (.043) (.0292) (.0193) 
Literacy rate -.072 -.0154 .0351  -.0846 -.0148 .0306 
   (.407) (.2608) (.152)  (.2927) (.1783) (.1371) 
General geography 
Latitude .0039 .0123 .0151  .0026 .0123 .0147* 
   (.0355) (.0139) (.0094)  (.0244) (.0098) (.0088) 
Longitude .0124 .013 .0146  .0121 .013 .0144 
   (.0146) (.0128) (.009)  (.0126) (.0111) (.0089) 
Landlock -.0275 -.0192 -.0353  -.0273 -.0193 -.037 
   (.0588) (.0346) (.0355)  (.0637) (.0292) (.0345) 
Capital -.072 -.0935 -.0693  -.0731 -.0932 -.0715 
   (.0745) (.1102) (.0536)  (.0721) (.0785) (.0519) 
Land area -.0296 -.0208 -.0172  -.0307 -.0208 -.0168 
   (.0296) (.0201) (.022)  (.0219) (.02) (.0219) 
Elevation -.005 .0106 .0139  -.0068 .0107 .0143 
   (.0487) (.0214) (.0164)  (.0327) (.0208) (.0166) 
Terrain ruggedness .0005 .0012 .0014*  .0004 .0012* .0014* 
   (.0022) (.0007) (.0008)  (.0016) (.0007) (.0008) 
Temperature -.0077 .0011 .0037  -.0087 .0011 .004 
   (.0273) (.0081) (.0072)  (.0186) (.0077) (.0073) 
Precipitation -.0941 -.0457 -.0316  -.0996 -.0457 -.0295 
   (.1664) (.0344) (.0301)  (.1174) (.0319) (.0243) 
Temperature range -.01 -.007 -.0126  -.0098 -.007 -.0128 
   (.0117) (.0135) (.0104)  (.0123) (.0099) (.0107) 
Precipitation range 0 0 -.0001  0 0 0 
   (.0004) (.0005) (.0003)  (.0003) (.0003) (.0002) 
Sunshine .0127 .0061 .0023  .0138 .0061 .0026 
   (.0405) (.0229) (.014)  (.0319) (.0193) (.0142) 
Humidity .0413 .0554*** .055***  .0401* .0554*** .0555*** 
   (.034) (.0117) (.0106)  (.0226) (.0106) (.01) 
Rain days -.0018 -.0013 -.001  -.0019 -.0013 -.0011 
   (.0037) (.0021) (.0013)  (.0026) (.0012) (.001) 
Windspeed .0025 .0015 .003  .0022 .0016 .0024 
   (.0105) (.012) (.008)  (.0078) (.0068) (.0057) 
Natural resources 
Oil & Gas -.0029 -.0005 -.0003  -.0031 -.0004 -.0003 
   (.0078) (.001) (.0008)  (.0055) (.0009) (.0008) 
Diamonds -.0033 -.0058 -.0005  -.0038 -.0057 -.0011 
 (.0212) (.0236) (.0121)  (.0196) (.0165) (.0113) 
Precious metals .0014** .0015*** .0015***  .0014*** .0015*** .0015*** 
   (.0006) (.0005) (.0006)  (.0005) (.0005) (.0005) 
Base metals -.2142*** -.224*** -.216***  -.214*** -.2239*** -.2159*** 
 (.0769) (.0719) (.0763)  (.0782) (.0707) (.0747) 
Iron  .353 .2519** .1666  .3661* .2516*** .1518 
 (.3176) (.0984) (.1808)  (.2089) (.0858) (.1451) 
Alloys -.1687 -.1361 -.0999  -.1758 -.1358 -.1004 
   (.2147) (.1441) (.1405)  (.149) (.1134) (.1371) 
        
_cons 2.8061 .9868 .472  3.0528 .9809 .4986 
   (6.9219) (1.6714) (.4183)  (4.5946) (.9247) (.3905) 
        
Observations 270 270 270  270 270 270 
R-squared .9239 .9497 .9598  .9163 .9499 .9586 
All Controls  YES YES YES  YES YES YES 
Country Fixed Ef-
fects 
YES YES YES 
 
 YES YES YES 
The table reports second-stage IV estimates of regressions of ln(GNI/capita) on different dimensions of trust.  The left panel reports the IV 
estimates using polarization at stage two as instrument, the right panel reports IV estimates using fractionalization at stage one as instrument. The 
unit of observation is a region. Columns (1) and (4) report the coefficients that correspond to trust in relatives, columns (2) and (5) those corre-
sponding to trust in neighbors, columns (3) and (6) those corresponding to trust in other people you know. All regressions include country fixed 
effects and the complete set of educational and geographic controls presented in section 3. Robust standard errors, adjusted for clustering at the 







Table 8.8: Economic Development and various trust dummies: OLS estimates 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Trust in relatives Trust in neighbors Trust in other people you 
know 
Generalized trust 
Social capital proxy     
Respective Trust Dimension .0527 .0703* .0346 .0418 
   (.0353) (.0374) (.0296) (.033) 
Human geography     
Urbanization .3848*** .3724*** .3721*** .365*** 
   (.1172) (.1176) (.1172) (.1162) 
Education     
Expected schooling -.0139 -.0125 -.013 -.0119 
   (.0125) (.0137) (.0135) (.0132) 
Mean schooling .1461*** .1478*** .1453*** .1449*** 
   (.0174) (.0178) (.018) (.0181) 
Literacy rate .1032 .0922 .0828 .0966 
   (.1468) (.1506) (.1517) (.1559) 
General geography     
Latitude (.0103) (.0105) (.0105) .0148 
   .0198** .0195** .0191** (.011) 
Longitude (.0079) (.0074) (.0078) .0191** 
   -.0022 -.0092 -.0043 (.0079) 
Landlock (.0314) (.0347) (.0345) -.012 
   .0124 .0237 .0208 (.0378) 
Capital (.0389) (.0393) (.0399) .0174 
   -.0115 -.0121 -.0143 (.0408) 
Land area (.0206) (.0203) (.0208) -.014 
   -.0019 .0001 -.0009 (.0202) 
Elevation (.0165) (.0164) (.0164) -.0019 
   .0003 .0003 .0004 (.0166) 
Terrain ruggedness (.0007) (.0007) (.0007) .0004 
   -.0028 -.0027 -.0031 (.0007) 
Climate     
Temperature (.0033) (.0036) (.0036) -.0034 
   -.0508 -.0595* -.0602* (.0036) 
Precipitation (.0348) (.0324) (.0326) -.0589* 
   -.0042 -.006 -.0044 (.0336) 
Temperature range (.016) (.0154) (.0154) -.0041 
   -.0001 -.0001 -.0001 (.0163) 
Precipitation range (.0001) (.0001) (.0001) -.0001 
   .0122 .0111 .0119 (.0001) 
Sunshine (.0149) (.0146) (.0151) .0111 
   .0503*** .0516*** .0516*** (.0146) 
Humidity (.0101) (.01) (.01) .0528*** 
   -.0004 -.0003 -.0003 (.0094) 
Rain days (.0005) (.0005) (.0005) -.0003 
   .0046 .0047 .0048 (.0005) 
Windspeed (.0032) (.0032) (.0033) .0044 
   -.0007 -.0007 -.0006 (.0032) 
Natural resources     
Oil & Gas (.0007) (.0008) (.0008) -.001 
   .0004 .0018 .0024 (.0009) 
Diamonds (.0129) (.0138) (.0138) .006 
 .0011 .0012* .0011 (.0131) 
Precious metals (.0007) (.0007) (.0007) .0011 
   -.1803** -.1795** -.1848** (.0007) 
Base metals (.0818) (.0862) (.0828) -.1769** 
 .2076** .2101** .2258** (.0817) 
Iron  (.0979) (.0994) (.0993) .2154** 
 -.0614 -.0582 -.0586 (.1002) 
Alloys (.1179) (.1229) (.1216) -.0604 
   (.1456) (.123) (.1262) (.1199) 
     
_cons .442 .487 .5416 .5096 
   (.3906) (.3655) (.3704) (.3692) 
     
Observations 336 336 336 336 
R-squared .9562 .9562 .9567 .9561 
All Control Variables YES YES YES YES 
Country Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES 
The table reports OLS estimates of regressions of ln(GNI/capita) on different trust dummies which become one if the respective region has a share 
of trusting people above the median value in the respective trust dimension and zero elsewise. The unit of observation is a region. Column (1) 
reports the coefficient that corresponds to the dummy of trust in relatives. Column (2) reports the coefficient corresponding to the dummy of trust 
in neighbors. Column (3) reports the coefficient corresponding to the dummy of trust in other people you know. Column (4) reports the coefficient 
corresponding to the dummy of generalized trust. All regressions include country fixed effects and the complete set of educational and geographic 
controls presented in section 3. Robust standard errors, adjusted for clustering at the country-level, are reported below coefficients in parentheses. 







Table 8.9: Economic Development and various trust dummies: IV estimates 
 (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) 
















 Instrument: Polarization at stage 2  Fractionalization at stage 1 
Social capital proxy 
Resp. trust dim. .0869 .0374 .0284 -.1121  -1.27 -.5361 -9.2302 -.2353 
 (1.0479) (.4521) (.3519) (1.3944)  (3.3863) (.5586) (114.3232) (.2533) 
Human geography 
Urbanization .391** .3738*** .3727*** .4031  .1462 .3973*** 1.2288 .4336*** 
 (.162) (.116) (.1252) (.3079)  (.6271) (.1458) (10.9738) (.1279) 
Education          
Exp. schooling -.0143 -.0129 -.013 -.0171  -.0002 -.0195 -.1142 -.0213 
   (.0155) (.0131) (.0127) (.0486)  (.0462) (.0167) (1.2823) (.0148) 
Mean schooling .1471*** .1463*** .1452*** .144***  .1091 .1202*** -.0273 .1432*** 
   (.0326) (.0251) (.017) (.0191)  (.1024) (.0412) (2.1069) (.0178) 
Literacy rate .1156 .0885 .083 .051  -.3738 .023 .4634 .0144 
   (.4181) (.1514) (.1352) (.4198)  (1.2042) (.1915) (4.8977) (.1418) 
General geography 
Latitude .0119 .0135 .0132 .0071  .0237 .0012 -.1419 .001 
   (.0153) (.0106) (.0092) (.0734)  (.0364) (.017) (1.9669) (.0161) 
Longitude .0203 .0193** .0191*** .0194**  .0026 .0166 .0288 .0197** 
   (.0167) (.0076) (.007) (.0089)  (.0483) (.0142) (.1705) (.0082) 
Landlock .0003 -.0078 -.0046 .0097  -.0996 .0173 -.5015 .0271 
   (.0911) (.0278) (.0433) (.2067)  (.2908) (.0414) (6.3491) (.0382) 
Capital -.0101 -.0128 -.0142 -.0124  -.0639 -.0244 .1858 -.0112 
   (.0327) (.0138) (.0242) (.0143)  (.1417) (.0227) (2.5887) (.0203) 
Land area .0105 .0198 .0198 .01  .0863 -.0483 -1.4452 .0042 
   (.0717) (.0632) (.065) (.0786)  (.1858) (.0705) (17.8183) (.0431) 
Elevation -.0023 -.0005 -.001 .0007  .015 -.0111 -.0816 .0028 
   (.0197) (.0168) (.0152) (.0303)  (.0506) (.0263) (1.0591) (.0166) 
Terrain ruggedness .0004 .0003 .0004 .0002  .0001 .0003 -.0061 .0001 
   (.0006) (.0006) (.0006) (.0015)  (.0014) (.0006) (.0776) (.0006) 
Climate          
Temperature -.0025 -.0029 -.0031 -.0027  -.0132 -.007 -.0276 -.0021 
   (.0094) (.0052) (.0036) (.0079)  (.03) (.0064) (.3204) (.0034) 
Precipitation -.0449 -.0597** -.0601** -.0627  -.2789 -.0633 .0198 -.0658** 
   (.1864) (.0302) (.0289) (.0418)  (.6073) (.0442) (1.138) (.0306) 
Temperature range -.0049 -.0047 -.0042 -.0006  .022 .019 .335 .0021 
   (.0214) (.0195) (.0156) (.0387)  (.0723) (.0274) (4.1932) (.0154) 
Precipitation range -.0001 -.0001 -.0001 -.0001  .0001 0 .0046 -.0001 
   (.0003) (.0002) (.0002) (.0001)  (.0007) (.0002) (.058) (.0001) 
Sunshine .0121 .0117 .012 .0156  .0149 .0213 .1222 .0192 
   (.0134) (.0154) (.0142) (.0442)  (.0222) (.0295) (1.411) (.0213) 
Humidity .0495* .0515*** .0516*** .0479  .0799 .0502*** .0037 .044*** 
   (.027) (.0088) (.0088) (.0464)  (.0744) (.0131) (.5955) (.0139) 
Rain days -.0004 -.0003 -.0003 -.0005  .0002 -.0009 -.0167 -.0007 
   (.0006) (.0006) (.0008) (.002)  (.002) (.0011) (.1999) (.0006) 
Windspeed .0047 .0046 .0047 .0049  .0018 .0032 -.0733 .0053 
   (.0043) (.0035) (.005) (.007)  (.011) (.0054) (.9546) (.004) 
Natural resources 
Oil & Gas -.0007 -.0006 -.0006 .0006  .0013 .0003 .0056 .0019 
   (.0017) (.001) (.0007) (.0146)  (.005) (.0016) (.0731) (.0026) 
Diamonds -.0003 .0017 .0022 -.0103  .03 .0004 -.2 -.0234 
 (.0251) (.0124) (.0151) (.1475)  (.0822) (.0141) (2.5391) (.0329) 
Precious metals .0011* .0011 .0011* .0009  .0006 .0002 -.0053 .0008 
   (.0007) (.0008) (.0006) (.0018)  (.0016) (.001) (.0801) (.0006) 
Base metals -.1794** -.1805** -.1843** -.1947  -.2155 -.1986*** .6479 -.209*** 
 (.0767) (.0757) (.0821) (.1823)  (.1486) (.0731) (10.678) (.0787) 
Iron  .1998 .2145** .2247* .2311  .5093 .2929* -1.4215 .2437*** 
 (.2286) (.0901) (.1223) (.1862)  (.8262) (.1725) (21.1523) (.0884) 
Alloys -.0581 -.0621 -.06 -.0828  -.1894 -.1297 -2.177 -.1006 
   (.1491) (.1228) (.137) (.2256)  (.4083) (.1858) (26.6483) (.1201) 
          
_cons .3673 .5196 .5443 .6832  3.3239 1.0888 4.5979 .8222* 
   (2.2473) (.5235) (.3585) (1.6392)  (7.7516) (.7795) (49.2896) (.4309) 
          
Observations 270 270 270 270  270 270 270 270 
R-squared .9561 .9565 .9561 .9513  .7204 .894 -17.607 .9403 
Controls  YES YES YES YES  YES YES YES YES 
Country FE YES YES YES 
 
YES  YES YES YES YES 
The table reports second-stage IV estimates of regressions of ln(GNI/capita) on different trust dummies which become one if the respective region 
has a share of trusting people above the median value in the respective trust dimension and zero elsewise. Both instruments, ethnic polarization at 
level two and ethnic fractionalization at level one, are equally turned into dummy variables so that they become one if a region is above the median 
ethnic polarization/fractionalization and zero elsewise. The left panel reports the second-stage estimates using the dummy for polarization at stage 
two, and the right panel reports second-stage estimates using the dummy for fractionalization at stage one. The unit of observation is a region. 
Columns (1) and (5) report the coefficients that corresponds to the dummy of trust in relatives. Columns (2) and (6) report the coefficients corre-
sponding to the dummy of trust in neighbors. Columns (3) and (7) report the coefficients corresponding to the dummy of trust in other people you 
know. Columns (4) and (8) report the coefficients corresponding to the dummy of generalized trust. All regressions include country fixed effects 
and the complete set of educational and geographic controls presented in section 3. Robust standard errors, adjusted for clustering at the country-




Table 8.10: Night-time luminosity and various trust dimensions: OLS estimates 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Trust in relatives Trust in neighbors Trust in other people 
you know 
Generalized trust 
Social capital proxy     
Respective Trust Dimension -.3571 -.5029 .1742 .0632 
   (.4154) (.3558) (.4086) (.5653) 
Human geography     
Urbanization 1.9041*** 1.9141*** 1.885*** 1.8887*** 
   (.6617) (.6578) (.6551) (.656) 
Education     
Expected schooling -.0324 -.0361 -.0291 -.0303 
   (.0377) (.037) (.0371) (.0405) 
Mean schooling .0104 .0069 .0164 .0158 
   (.0909) (.0904) (.0887) (.0884) 
Literacy rate .949 .929 .9898 .9824 
   (.5887) (.577) (.5798) (.5926) 
General geography     
Latitude -.0298 -.0299 -.0257 -.0263 
   (.0436) (.0422) (.0444) (.043) 
Longitude .0292 .0283 .0301 .0295 
   (.0243) (.0248) (.0234) (.0226) 
Landlock -.1091 -.1022 -.1057 -.1112 
   (.1715) (.171) (.1684) (.1708) 
Capital .6815*** .66*** .6892*** .6835*** 
   (.2312) (.2344) (.2363) (.2357) 
Land area -.7177*** -.7167*** -.7159*** -.7155*** 
   (.0807) (.0801) (.0811) (.0799) 
Elevation -.0181 -.0151 -.0148 -.0135 
   (.0607) (.0616) (.0617) (.0621) 
Terrain ruggedness .0002 .0003 .0004 .0004 
   (.0028) (.0028) (.0026) (.0027) 
Climate     
Temperature .0259 .0275 .0275 .0285 
   (.0249) (.0261) (.0264) (.0261) 
Precipitation -.0649 -.0562 -.0564 -.0525 
   (.0953) (.0934) (.0997) (.0952) 
Temperature range -.0643 -.0611 -.0644 -.0655 
   (.0572) (.0576) (.0553) (.0589) 
Precipitation range -.0003 -.0002 -.0004 -.0003 
   (.0005) (.0005) (.0006) (.0005) 
Sunshine -.0528 -.0518 -.0565 -.0556 
   (.0524) (.0532) (.054) (.0537) 
Humidity .0396 .0441 .0415 .0426 
   (.0294) (.0262) (.0267) (.0269) 
Rain days -.0013 -.0015 -.0008 -.001 
   (.0024) (.0023) (.0023) (.0021) 
Windspeed -.001 -.0031 .0012 -.0004 
   (.0145) (.015) (.016) (.0144) 
Natural resources     
Oil & Gas .0195*** .02*** .0201*** .02*** 
   (.0022) (.0022) (.0024) (.0024) 
Diamonds -.0559 -.0602 -.0535 -.0539 
 (.0982) (.0994) (.1009) (.1002) 
Precious metals .0022 .0022 .0023 .0023 
   (.0017) (.0016) (.0017) (.0018) 
Base metals -.2175 -.2236 -.2184 -.2185 
 (.3297) (.3179) (.3474) (.3452) 
Iron  .5454 .535 .5478 .5087 
 (.5274) (.5158) (.5181) (.5256) 
Alloys .5909 .58 .6092 .6137 
   (.564) (.5386) (.5979) (.6135) 
     
_cons 6.0685*** 5.931*** 5.4118*** 5.4438** 
   (1.82) (1.8723) (1.7808) (1.9477) 
     
Observations 270 270 270 270 
R-squared .9032 .9038 .903 .9029 
All Control Variables YES YES YES YES 
Country Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES 
The table reports OLS estimates of regressions of night-time luminosity on different dimensions of trust. The unit of observation is a region. 
Column (1) reports the coefficient that corresponds to trust in relatives, column (2) that corresponding to trust in neighbors, column (3) that 
corresponding to trust in other people you know, column (4) that corresponding to generalized trust. All regressions include country fixed effects 
and the complete set of educational and geographic controls presented in section 3. Robust standard errors, adjusted for clustering at the country-




Table 8.11: GNI/capita, night-time luminosity, and group membership variables: OLS estimates 
























 Dependent Variable: ln(GNI/capita)  Dependent Variable: Night-time luminosity 
Social capital proxy 
Resp. membership var. .0032 -.0737 -.0309 -.026  -1.1099** -.2455 -.3314** -1.2654** 
 (.095) (.1027) (.0229) (.1474)  (.4193) (.4367) (.1185) (.4553) 
Human geography 
Urbanization .3796*** .3659*** .3438** .3591***  1.7077** 1.8398** 1.5421** 1.5917** 
 (.12) (.1187) (.1257) (.1263)  (.6612) (.7086) (.6702) (.6166) 
Education          
Exp. schooling -.0121 -.0114 -.0058 -.008  -.0195 -.0301 -.0069 -.0248 
   (.0131) (.0131) (.0124) (.013)  (.0354) (.0393) (.0364) (.0374) 
Mean schooling .1444*** .1446*** .1401*** .1411***  .0178 .0169 .0591 .0723 
   (.0177) (.0174) (.0169) (.0169)  (.0831) (.0886) (.0683) (.0709) 
Literacy rate .0856 .0936 .0738 .0771  .9772* 1.0112 .8235 .8501 
   (.1449) (.1473) (.138) (.1414)  (.5577) (.6175) (.6085) (.6042) 
General geography 
Latitude .0124 .0119 .0113 .0114  -.0323 -.0288 -.0313 -.0259 
   (.0101) (.01) (.0103) (.0102)  (.0429) (.0437) (.0449) (.0429) 
Longitude .0167** .0168** .015* .0147*  .0298 .0313 .0276 .027 
   (.0079) (.0078) (.0084) (.0084)  (.0217) (.0221) (.0225) (.0231) 
Landlock -.0088 -.0069 -.0076 -.0098  -.0618 -.1017 -.025 -.0603 
   (.0344) (.0343) (.0333) (.0331)  (.1767) (.1693) (.1626) (.1693) 
Capital .0086 .0085 -.0073 -.0057  .6712*** .6849*** .5201** .5365** 
   (.039) (.0395) (.0397) (.04)  (.2362) (.2377) (.2055) (.2049) 
Land area -.013 -.0135 -.0083 -.0089  -.7077*** -.7169*** -.7685*** -.7752*** 
   (.0203) (.02) (.0253) (.0251)  (.0818) (.0827) (.0732) (.0691) 
Elevation -.0007 .0002 -.0042 -.006  -.0193 -.0121 .0132 .0117 
   (.0168) (.0166) (.0175) (.0176)  (.0776) (.0608) (.0714) (.0757) 
Terrain ruggedness .0003 .0003 .0004 .0003  .0005 .0004 -.0021 -.002 
   (.0007) (.0007) (.0009) (.0009)  (.0027) (.0027) (.0022) (.0022) 
Climate          
Temperature -.0024 -.0025 -.0027 -.0031  .0295 .0274 .0259 .025 
   (.0033) (.0033) (.0041) (.0041)  (.0264) (.0266) (.0278) (.0276) 
Precipitation -.0678** -.0695** -.0733** -.0746**  -.0058 -.0551 -.1167 -.0486 
   (.0282) (.0312) (.0282) (.0299)  (.1054) (.0988) (.0979) (.1078) 
Temperature range .0013 .001 .0034 .0031  -.0587 -.066 -.0367 -.0443 
   (.0151) (.0151) (.0146) (.0146)  (.0573) (.0569) (.0579) (.0584) 
Precipitation range -.0002 -.0001 -.0002 -.0002  -.0002 -.0003 -.0006 -.0005 
   (.0001) (.0001) (.0001) (.0001)  (.0005) (.0005) (.0005) (.0005) 
Sunshine .0127 .0131 .0122 .0133  -.0746 -.0544 -.0258 -.0337 
   (.0146) (.015) (.0153) (.0158)  (.0507) (.0542) (.0422) (.0428) 
Humidity .0525*** .0522*** .0523*** .0529***  .0242 .0414 .0262 .017 
   (.0103) (.0102) (.0112) (.0112)  (.0267) (.0268) (.03) (.0287) 
Rain days -.0003 -.0003 -.0002 -.0002  -.0011 -.0009 .0002 -.0006 
   (.0005) (.0005) (.0005) (.0005)  (.0021) (.0022) (.0023) (.0023) 
Windspeed .0053 .0052 .0058 .0053  -.0031 -.0006 .0092 .003 
   (.0033) (.0034) (.004) (.004)  (.0142) (.0151) (.0146) (.0163) 
Natural resources 
Oil & Gas -.0005 -.0002 -.0003 -.0006  .0222*** .0209*** .023*** .0225*** 
   (.0008) (.0008) (.0008) (.0008)  (.0024) (.0021) (.002) (.0022) 
Diamonds -.0037 -.0034 -.0049 -.0055  -.0542 -.0524 -.0828 -.0748 
 (.0129) (.0126) (.0114) (.0115)  (.1021) (.0994) (.0927) (.0907) 
Precious metals .0011* .0011* .0011* .0011*  .0022 .0021 .0025 .0021 
   (.0007) (.0006) (.0006) (.0006)  (.0017) (.0018) (.0018) (.0018) 
Base metals -.183** -.1796** -.1428* -.1436*  -.2288 -.204 -.236 -.2472 
 (.0819) (.08) (.0773) (.0779)  (.3252) (.3498) (.314) (.3217) 
Iron  .2372** .2285** .2206** .2274**  .4517 .4814 .6605 .6433 
 (.0923) (.0944) (.0981) (.0967)  (.5816) (.5385) (.4913) (.5587) 
Alloys -.0667 -.0687 -.2128 -.2097  .7305 .5988 .4832 .6283 
   (.1236) (.1205) (.1443) (.1536)  (.5573) (.5876) (.5047) (.5269) 
          
_cons .5327 .5507 .5688 .5627  5.6005*** 5.5431*** 6.2507*** 5.7896*** 
   (.3549) (.3617) (.3716) (.3729)  (1.9575) (1.9124) (1.8559) (1.9343) 
          
Observations 270 270 270 270  270 270 270 270 
R-squared .9561 .9565 .9561 .9513  .7204 .894 -17.607 .9403 
Controls  YES YES YES YES  YES YES YES YES 
Country FE YES YES YES 
 
YES  YES YES YES YES 
The table reports OLS estimates of regressions of night-time luminosity and ln(GNI/capita) on different group membership variables. The left 
panel reports the OLS results of regressions of ln(GNI/capita) on group membership, the right panel reports OLS results of regression of night-
time luminosity on group membership. The unit of observation is a region. Columns (1) and (5) report the coefficients that correspond to member-
ship in religious communities, columns (2) and (6) those corresponding to active membership in religious communities, columns (3) and (7) those 
corresponding to membership in voluntary associations, columns (4) and (8) those corresponding to active membership in voluntary associations. 
All regressions include country fixed effects and the complete set of educational and geographic controls presented in section 3. Robust standard 
errors, adjusted for clustering at the country-level, are reported below coefficients in parentheses. Asterisks denote levels of statistical significance 
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